# Table of contents

GEMM Project Policy Briefs ........................................................................................................................................... 2

WP2 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 3

WP2 Secondary Data Analysis – 5 Major Policy implications ................................................................. 5
  Country differences in labour market integration of refugees and economic migrants ................ 7
  Minority Embeddedness and Economic Integration: is Diversity Or Homogeneity Associated With Better Employment Outcomes ................................................................. 9
  Labour market penalties by host-country human capital ........................................................................... 11
  Immigrant-Native Unemployment Gaps in West-Europe ......................................................................... 13
  Immigrant’s careers in Italy, Spain and France ....................................................................................... 15
  Ethnic and migrant penalties in job quality in the UK ............................................................................. 17
  Briefing 2017-6: Labour market effects of residential minority concentration ....................................... 19
  EU citizenship and immigrants’ occupational outcomes in Western Europe ......................................... 20
  Immigrant women’s employment patterns: disentangling the effects of ethnic origin, religious affiliation and religiosity ........................................................................................................ 22
  Who benefits from host country investments? Evidence of heterogeneous labour market returns to host country investments by migrant motivation ........................................... 24

WP3 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 26

WP3 Field Experiments - 5 Policy implications .................................................................................. 28
  Policy brief on cross-national patterns in discrimination in hiring behaviour- Results from a cross-national field experiment – Overall results ............................................................................ 31
  Results from a cross-national field experiment: United Kingdom ......................................................... 35
  Results from a cross-national field experiment: Spain ............................................................................ 38
  Results from a cross-national field experiment: Germany .................................................................... 41
  Results from a cross-national field experiment: Netherlands .............................................................. 44
  Results from a cross-national field experiment: Norway ................................................................. 47

WP4 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 49

WP4 Qualitative Interviews - 5 Policy implications ........................................................................... 52
  Preliminary results from GEMM WP4 fieldwork ..................................................................................... 55
  The role of recruiting agencies in labour mobility – the case of Bulgaria ............................................. 57
  Individual and contextual factors of Romanian migrants’ motivation ................................................... 59
  Great expectations? Young southern Europeans emigrating in times of crisis ..................................... 62
  Migrant’s identity re-positioning in Berlin and London ....................................................................... 64
  Lived experiences of Romanian migrants in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK .................................. 67

WP5 ........................................................................................................................................................................... 70

Comparison of Institutional Arrangements Managing Migration and the Integration of Immigrants ... 71
The GEMM project delivers an assessment of labour market inequalities of migrants and minorities in Europe. We especially focus on highly skilled migrants to Europe, who do not always find jobs in which their skills are used most effectively. By understanding the drivers of these inequalities and determining how institutional factors account for differences between countries, we provide recommendations of great practical and policy relevance. We achieve our goals through using different research methods - experiments, in-depth interviews and statistical analyses of existing data - and through considering different determinants - individual, contextual and institutional. We are thus able to compare integration processes and outcomes over different countries in Europe and can highlight the factors that help to successfully integrate migrants and minorities in the host country labour market - to the benefit of both minorities and the majority population.

The GEMM project strives to produce research that is highly usable for policy makers. In order to do so, we implemented an innovative methodological framework that considers different determinants of inequality as a barrier to the smooth functioning of local labour markets. We include multiple units of analysis - the (migrant) individual (WP2 and WP4), the receiving society employers (WP3) and the societal context (WP2 and WP5). Thus, we offer multidimensionality, the consideration of various explanatory mechanisms and causal paths. Moreover, we highlight that migrant and minority individuals are embedded in a social and institutional context, which affects ethnic inequality and thus the labour market opportunities in Europe. Our analyses can be used to visualize areas of labour market disadvantage experienced by groups and individuals that need targeted attention with policies from both national and local governments. The qualitative component emphasizes the lived experience of migration and will serve as a basis for specific recommendations of how mobility of skilled migrants can be managed. The reports that we deliver offer a comprehensive perspective on how migration can contribute to growth in Europe.
WP2

The main objective in WP2 is to further our understanding of how migrants’ human capital is utilized and of the barriers involved in sustaining disadvantage. We cover several dimensions (individual, contextual and institutional) that can hinder the migrant worker’s full incorporation in the receiving country and his or her complementarity to the native workforce. Considering contextual and institutional factors is a crucial contribution, as most of the existing migration reports and studies focus on individual factors with no understanding of the role of community embeddedness and the general reception of the migrant in the receiving society.

In this work package we made use of a wealth of secondary data (country survey data from the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Norway, Canada and the US as well as European cross-national data) to study individual, contextual and institutional factors affecting labour market integration of migrants across different European countries. We have had nine main research tasks which address leading problems in the field of the labour market incorporation of immigrants and the second generation, and that relate directly to work in the WPs collecting new information, WP3 and WP4. For example, our consideration of the feminization of different sectors and the presence of migrants in different sectors (in a cross-national perspective) was important for contextualizing the results in WP3; or the job search patterns of migrants have been informative for the setting of interviews in WP4. Thus, the work carried out within this package further helped inform the work of the other work packages and was modified to adapt to their demands and the demands of the fieldwork to provide contextual data to inform the important pathways towards settlement and finding work in WP4; and to provide regional and national comparative data to help place the experimental data and findings on discrimination of WP3 which was also used to ascertain the existing ethnic gaps in Britain. WP2 has been modified as well to include also a focus on the labour market performance of majority members under conditions of greater competition from migrants, and growing diversity.
# Researchers involved

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* Coordinator and WP2 Leader
1. **Human Capital:** Across European societies, Muslim migrants and their children are particularly likely to have both their qualifications and any further training undertaken in the receiving context discounted. The observed patterns should be of considerable concern to policy makers as they attest to poor short and long term prospects for most migrant and second generation groups. In designing migration policies it is also important to note that further courses, training and good language skills primarily benefit the employment probability of economic migrants who already have higher qualifications. However, such investments are crucial for non-economic migrants along their skill spectrum. Host country acquisitions such as further qualifications are particularly important in keeping non-economic migrants from lapsing into unemployment. Having attended a language course positively affects the employment probability of refugee migrants which highlights the importance of the integration efforts of the receiving society.

2. **Job quality:** With UK data, we find there is little evidence of competition in migrant-heavy occupations undercutting white Britons’ job quality; but second generation minority men, particularly Black Caribbean and Black African minority men may be vulnerable to a race-to-the-bottom facilitated by the competition with migrants. Our results for men are consistent with an ethnic hierarchy that places natives on the top and non-white migrants at the bottom, but with some second generation minority members, Black Caribbeans and Black Africans lagging behind white migrants.

3. **Ethnic niches and naturalization:** In European countries, living in an area with many minorities does not affect the majority, but migrants and minorities lose out on the labour market as they lack useful contacts with the majority, which can help them get good jobs and keep them employed. Naturalization is a particularly important type of commitment. In our work we find that naturalized migrants generally find more high-quality work, possibly as employers have...
more certainty on skills and it is a strong signal), but the effect on employment is more mixed and differs strongly by country (generally negative in Southern Europe).

4. **The receiving context**: The share of co-ethnics can also have some positive effects however particularly in negative receiving environment (e.g. where natives believe migrants are an economic burden). Migrants appear to be more likely to invest in a context with a more positive labour policy environment while negative initial conditions, such as a high unemployment rate or a low rate of decisions on asylum applications for refugees, reduce the further host country acquisitions. This matters as it is precisely for this group of non-economic migrants that investments have higher returns.
Non-economic migrants, and especially refugees, tend to do less well on the labour market than other groups of migrants. In this overview, we briefly discuss how the differences between migrants seeking protection and economic migrants vary between countries. We use data on established migrants, resident for five years or more (1), in Western Europe in 2008 to illustrate whether the main migration motivation affects labour market outcomes. Refugees and asylum seekers are not spread evenly over Europe. In 2008, high proportions of established migrants in Southern Europe had arrived for economic reasons and very few came seeking protection. In the older receiving countries in Northern and Western Europe the origin of migrants is more varied, with more people arriving seeking refuge or for family reasons. The UK stands out with almost a quarter of migrants having arrived for study as shown in figure 1. Despite some movement towards a common European policy the integration of asylum seekers and refugees varies between member states (2). Here we briefly mention three aspects that affect the integration of humanitarian migrants (3).

FINDINGS

1. First, the housing provisions and other benefits for asylum seekers differ strongly. While many asylum seekers initially stay in a reception centre, the duration of their stay and the quality of these centres can vary greatly over countries. In the UK for instance time in a reception centre is generally very short, after which they are dispersed. As housing is dispersed away from London and application to housing benefits are very cumbersome many asylum seekers end up in precarious housing.

On the other hand, asylum seekers may spend months or even years in centres awaiting official decision on their status in the Netherlands. This time can be isolating and harm labour market prospects (4).

2. Second, countries differ in the restrictions on work faced by asylum seekers and recognized refugees. The UK operates strict rules which mean that asylum seekers cannot work unless they have obtained refugee status. In Germany asylum seekers can obtain a work permit 3 months after registering, but employers have to demonstrate they could not find other employees, unless the asylum seeker works in a shortage occupation or has been in the country for longer than 15 months. Sweden poses few restrictions on the right to work for asylum seekers and refugees, even allowing a switch to labour market migrant status in case of an unsuccessful appeal(4). These variations matter as finding a job early on is generally an important step to finding work later and further integration.
Third, refugees face extra difficulties as they may have trouble proving their qualifications, often have language difficulties, and may also have experienced trauma (5). The availability of provisions as well as courses varies again by country.

We show whether labour market integration of migrants differs depending on their main motivation and compare migrants seeking protection with those arriving for economic reasons. A negative value means that refugees are less likely to be employed or work on lower status job, compared to similar natives, than an economic migrant.

Refugees are on average 7%-point less likely to be employed than economic migrants, but this difference is substantially larger in Ireland, the UK and Germany. Refugees in the UK also work on much lower-quality jobs than comparable economic migrants, while this quality-difference is close to 0 on average. Different policies of incorporation could be a possible reason for these differences. This could account for the large difference between migrant types in countries with more restrictive policies towards asylum seekers and refugees such as the UK and Germany, compared to for instance the Netherlands, Sweden or Norway.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

Within Europe there are large differences in the policies guiding how asylum seekers and refugees are treated, as well as in the outcomes faced by different types of migrants. Refugees fare particularly badly compared to similar economic migrants in Ireland and the UK in terms of employment while these differences are generally smaller in Northern countries.

1. Countries differ in their policies of allowing refugees to work; focusing on refugees that have been in residence for more than five years allows us to examine refugees with similar status
2. IMF (2016): The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges. SDN/16/02
3. For an overview of policies on which this briefing is based, read:
   - IMF (2016): The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic Challenges. IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/16/02 ;
Using data from the Managing Cultural Diversity Survey 2010 and the Ethnic Minority British Election Study 2010, we explore the activity and employment outcomes of majority and minority individuals in the UK, and examine their association with a variety of ethnic embeddedness measures at the individual and community level. We do not find that white British respondents living in areas of high deprivation and diversity experience lower levels of economic activity or bad jobs. Quite the contrary, they experience status gains in such scenarios. Deprivation rather than minority embeddedness stands out as the factor that serves to compound both majority and minority disadvantage.

### FINDINGS

**In general**, all minority groups register greater levels of embeddedness and deprivation than white British. Members of the South Asian community have the highest level of exposure. Areas with high levels of minority embeddedness also seem to experience higher levels of deprivation. The interaction of the two would be further explored in our models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Mean Prop Non-white Brit</th>
<th>Mean Prop Non-white Brit at high deprivation</th>
<th>Mean IMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White British</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean and African</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>3.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani and Bangladesi</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>2.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1255 respondents : MCDS data</td>
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Does exposure to minority embeddedness lower labour market outcomes?

**Deprivation** in our two datasets is a stronger predictor of poor economic integration than minority embeddedness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active Coef (se)</th>
<th>Employed Coef (se)</th>
<th>Professional Coef (se)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage non-White British</td>
<td>-0.113 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.042)</td>
<td>0.070 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>-0.043** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.036** (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Controlled:**
- Ethnic Group, ln age, gender, co-ethnic organization, co-ethnic friend, marital status, housing, education, degree of urbanization, residential stability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N MCDS data</th>
<th>chi2</th>
<th>p</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1255</td>
<td>237.213</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>957</td>
<td>88.294</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1650</td>
<td>308.180</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Minority Embeddedness:
We operationalize minority embeddedness at the local area level as the Percentage of Non-white British, thus drawing distinction to the exposure of minorities to the majority population and vice versa.

Deprivation:
IMD 2010 is an official measure of deprivation in small areas. It is based on seven domains: income, employment, education, skills and training, health, crime, etc.

The graph shows that white British respondents living in very deprived areas in our sample appear more advantaged at greater levels of minority embeddedness rather than at lower. Such an observation is in line with research showing that the competition between white British and minorities for jobs and status is relatively low (Dustmann et al 2010) and that competition is concentrated within the minority groups. In contrast, deprivation has a pronounced negative effect on Indians in terms of both activity and likelihood of reaching Professional and Managerial positions that is exacerbated at lower levels of exposure to the majority group. This result indicates that at high levels of deprivation, the ethnic niche can be a place of stagnation, while at low levels its effects for economic integration can be beneficial. With EMBES data we have established that the ethnic niche has particularly strong negative effect on the activity of migrant and minority women belonging to community in which there is a strict operation of gender norms.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION
This goes against the gloomy picture painted by pro-Brexit campaigners and the result merits further investigation. It is possible that white Britons in high diverse areas have also been exposed to greater precariousness of their positions and higher levels of job turnover which can explain rising subjective perceptions of disadvantage. More research needs to be done on the intersection of deprivation, minority and employment prospects. Co-ethnic bonding may not lead to welfare dependency but it seems it is associated with lower chance of getting the really good jobs.

Migrants are generally less likely to be employed and work in less good jobs than similar natives. Following traditional assimilation theories these penalties decrease over time as migrants acquire knowledge that is specific to the country of residence (Alba and Nee, 1997).

Non-economic migrants and especially refugees are less likely to be active and to be employed than other migrants. When employed they are more likely to be overqualified or work on otherwise worse jobs (Cangiano, 2015).

This brief discusses these gaps and how they vary by host-country human capital investments, such as learning the language, taking up host-country nationality or obtaining further qualifications or training. These require a deliberate decision, cost time and effort, and bring about rewards in terms of labour market outcomes (Cortes, 2004). We report outcomes for male economic migrants (without a contract upon arrival), refugees and family migrants. The patterns hold for women as well.

The first question is whether migrants differ in their take-up of host-country human capital. This could be because the probability of return migration differs between groups (Cortes, 2004) or because they have different ideas of successful migration (Luthra et al., 2016).

We find substantial differences between groups in their host-country human capital. Economic migrants are least likely to be naturalised or have equivalent qualifications. There is not much difference in language skills, but migrants who seek protection are much more likely to have also naturalised or to have equivalent qualifications. This is similar for migrants who arrive for family reasons.

The second question is how these factors affect the labour market integration of migrants. Migrants with low host-country investments, defined as having poor language skills, having no equivalent qualifications and not being naturalized are much more likely to be unemployed than natives and migrants who have all these forms of host-country human capital. Migrants with low investments work on lower quality jobs (an index ranging from 16 to 90 indicating status of work) than similar migrants with high host-country human capital and natives.

The effect of investments on unemployment is clearly the strongest for refugees while it makes less difference for the outcomes of economic migrants. Higher host-country human capital is positively associated with status for everyone, but more so for refugees and family migrants than economic migrants.
CONCLUSION

The initial motivation with which people migrate has long-term repercussions on the labour market. Migrants arriving for non-economic reasons are more likely to make long-term investments in the country of residence such as taking up host-country nationality or gaining more or equivalent qualifications than economic migrants. These investments matter as they take away some of the substantially higher disadvantage these migrants face on the labour market. Understanding these patterns and their determinants further is important in the European context as there are substantial differences between countries in the composition of migrants (Dumont et al., 2016).

REFERENCES


DATA AND METHODS

We use the 2008 ad-hoc module of the European LFS for 20,198 migrants aged 25-65 who were in the country longer than 5 years. Migrants were asked about their principal reason for migration and we report on male migrants who arrived for economic reasons without a contract (35%); refugees (10%) and family migrants (22%). We use coarsened exact matching (Iacus et al. 2012) to for each migrant compute the average outcome of natives living in the same region (NUTS-1), of the same gender, age and marital status and with the same qualifications (6 ISCED-codes). The outcomes shown here are whether respondents are unemployed rather than employed and, for those that are employed, the occupational status of their job imputed as ISEI scores by their occupation. The higher this score is the higher the socio-economic status of that job.
The difference between this calculated counterfactual and the migrants’ outcome is then modelled to explore the role of individual investments in host-country human capital. We consider naturalisation, language skills (whether the respondent thinks their language skills are good enough for an appropriate job) and whether qualifications are equivalent or obtained in the country of residence as investments. The results discussed in this briefing are the outcomes for migrants without any of these investments (low) and those with all three (high). The model controls for characteristics of the region of origin (religion, economic development and inequality) and includes fixed effects for the country of residence.
The estimates shown are for a highly qualified prime-age married migrant, but the difference between migrants and natives is constant (by model) regardless of socio-demographics.
SUMMARY

While the existence of substantial differences, across destination-countries, in Immigrant-Native Unemployment Gaps (INUGs) in Europe is well-established (Causa and Jean, 2007; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011), underlying mechanisms have not yet been clearly identified. Empirical analyses often take into account one or very few contextual characteristics simultaneously and are based on merely cross-sectional relations, a small number of countries and different definitions of the analytical sample. Existing research also paid little attention on how the cross-country pattern of INUGs in West-Europe changed before and after the Great Recession.

FINDINGS

The first research question of this briefing concerns the effects of a specific set of labour market institutions, such as the protection of standard employment (EPL), the flexibility of temporary contracts, the weight of unions and welfare provisions for the unemployed, and structural dimensions such as the demand for low-skilled jobs. These labour market characteristics have been selected because they are those theoretically most likely to affect the relative disadvantage of immigrant compared with native workers, adopting an insider-outsider perspective (Kogan, 2011). Second, we argue that the Great Recession is a crucial standpoint from which to understand the role of different labour market institutions and structures. The pattern of cross-country differences in INUGs changed dramatically with the crisis: immigrants’ unemployment, with respect to that of natives, increased much more in Southern than in Central and Northern Europe, where INUGs were much higher before the crisis.

Results show that while the EPL for regular contracts has no significant impact on INUGs, stricter regulations for temporary contracts tend to increase them (first graph of Figure 1). Also higher levels of Union Density (UD) and Unemployment Benefits (UBs) tend to worsen INUGs. When focusing on within-country differences, however, the pattern of institutional effects becomes more uncertain (third graph of Figure 1).

Figure 1. Linear probability model of unemployment risk. Interaction coefficients between immigrant dummy and contextual variables, with 95% confidence intervals.
As for the effects of the recent economic crisis, the structure of labour market demand in host countries seems to play the most important role: INUGs are lower in countries with a high incidence of low-skilled jobs before the economic crisis, but, after 2008, in the same countries INUGs experienced a huge increase (second graph of Figure 1). This is likely due to the higher sensitivity to the economic cycle in sectors and occupations usually held by immigrants.

Newly arrived immigrants (<=10 years since migration) are those who suffer the most from the limited availability of flexible forms of employment (Figure 2). The increases in the gap with natives driven by higher levels of UD and UBs are stronger among newly arrived immigrants and those belonging to more disadvantaged minorities (MENA/Other Africa).

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

Theoretical arguments, based on an insider-outsider perspective, suggest that the higher the level of labour market regulation, in terms of UBs, EPL and UD, the wider the INUGs. From the same theoretical standpoint, it can be expected that a higher unsatisfied demand for unskilled occupations is associated with lower INUGs. Our empirical evidence broadly corroborates these expectations. However, in regard to policy indications, economic and structural labour market factors are more important than labour market regulations, especially after the Great Recession. Only the findings concerning UBs, in fact, are consistent across different models’ specifications. The effects of other variables, and EPL in particular, seem more ambiguous and context-dependent.


Immigrants are found to be employed in less skilled jobs compared to natives in all Western European countries. However, empirical analyses usually adopt a static approach, while in this briefing we analyse immigrants’ occupational careers along the trajectory defined by the last job in the origin country, the first and the present job in the destination country. The Human Capital (HC) and Labour Market Segmentation (LMS) hypotheses predict different patterns and underlying mechanisms of immigrants’ occupational careers. We suggest the usefulness of a complementarity perspective comparing immigrants’ labour market trajectories in Italy, Spain and France.

According to the HC hypothesis (Chiswick, 1978), immigrants experience a downgrade of occupational status after arrival in the host country due to the limited transferability of skills acquired in the origin country, followed by a substantial recovery as time goes by and immigrants acquire HC specific to the host country (Chiswick et al., 2005). On the opposite, the LMS hypothesis states that immigrants are incorporated in the secondary segment of the LM and, thus, experience a huge downgrade of occupational status at their arrival followed by very limited chances of accessing the primary segment (Simón et al., 2014), largely independently of the level of skills transferability of the immigrant group and other individual characteristics. We argue that, in a comparative approach, a complementarity perspective is more useful: while LM structures shape the pattern of immigrants’ occupational mobility, i.e. the extent of immigrants’ occupational downgrade and recovery, the acquisition of country-specific HC remains the fundamental driver of occupational mobility in the host country.

Our empirical analyses show a higher immigrants’ occupational downgrade at arrival in Italy and Spain, compared to France (Figure 1). Overall patterns of occupational trajectories among immigrants from migration countries are very similar, especially in Italy and Spain. Differences across immigrant groups in terms of skills transferability thus play a minor role compared to differences in the contexts of reception, consistently with the LMS hypothesis.
When it comes to occupational mobility between the first and present job, the acquisition of country-specific HC, proxied by age at arrival, years since migration and the acquisition/recognition of educational credentials, is found to be associated to higher chances of upward mobility in all countries. In Italy and Spain, notwithstanding lower overall chances of status recovery, the acquisition of country-specific HC is particularly important for more segregated immigrant groups to reduce their gap with Western immigrants (Figure 2).

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

Empirical evidence is broadly consistent with our complementarity hypothesis. In highly segmented labour markets, like the Italian and Spanish ones, immigrant from migration countries have very low chances to reproduce the occupational status held in the origin country, largely irrespectively of differences in skills transferability. Immigrants in France experience an occupational downgrade in the frame of an overall higher persistence of socioeconomic status before and after migrating. However, while they only partly account for differences between immigrant groups, HC mechanisms still operate within them. Paradoxically, in Italy and Spain the acquisition of HC specific to the host country becomes even more important to enhance chances of occupational upgrading.

We use data from three surveys: the Spanish Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes (2007-2008), the French Trajéctories et Origines and the Italian Condizione e Integrazione Sociale dei Cittadini Stranieri (2011-2012). Empirical analyses are carried out on 1st gen immigrants, with work experience both before and after migration, aged between 15 and 55 at their arrival in the destination country and between 18 and 60 at interview. Information on the type of occupation, for the “three points” in time considered, derives from ISCO codes, which have been translated in ISEI scores. The surveys allowed to harmonize and include, as control variables, a large set of migration characteristics: reason for migrating, having found a job before or after migrating, family situation at arrival in the host country and language skills.


![Figure 2. OLS estimates of the effects of different types of tertiary education on immigrants' present job ISEI, with 90% confidence intervals (robust std.err.). Up to lower secondary is the reference category. Models control for first job ISEI and other characteristics (see methodological notes at the bottom of this page).](image)
SUMMARY

This briefing presents results on the types of jobs migrants, ethnic minorities and white British majority members carry out in the UK and whether they work under similar conditions as the white British majority. The jobs people have access to – beyond earnings – are a crucial indicator of their integration and equal opportunities in the UK. What factors contribute to differences and why should we care?

We identify five large groups of jobs and (1) show whether UK-born and migrant ethnic minorities work on different jobs than the white British; and (2) whether job quality is affected by the local ethnic diversity or increasing competition through migration.

UK-born minorities are not more likely to work on low quality jobs, but some groups face disadvantage in accessing the highest-quality work; while non-white migrants are clustered in the worst-quality jobs. Both local neighbourhood resources and occupational clustering shape these patterns and account partially for the separation in terms of job quality. There is little evidence of competition in migrant-heavy occupations undercutting white Britons’ job quality; but migrant and UK-born minority men may be vulnerable to a race-to-the-bottom facilitated by the competition with migrants.

FINDINGS

On average non-white migrants as well as Pakistani, Bangladeshi and black Caribbean UK-born minorities are much less likely to work on high-quality jobs than the white British, while all migrants as well as Pakistani UK-born workers are substantially more likely to work on the worst jobs. After accounting for the lower education, different socio-demographic composition and, importantly, different local resources of groups these gaps are much smaller, but UK-born Indian and Pakistani men are still 7 to 10 %-points less likely to work on high-quality jobs than very similar white British. Migrant workers are all more likely to work on the worst jobs.
We show how job quality changes for each group if they would move from a neighbourhood where their ethnic group is very small (lowest 10% in England and Wales) to one where there are many co-ethnics (highest 10% in England and Wales); and if they would change from an occupation with very few migrants to one with very many migrants. The transparent bars are not statistically significant (p<0.1). Living surrounded by co-ethnics can protect white migrants, Indian UK-born and to some extent Pakistani UK-born workers from the worst jobs; but black Caribbean UK-born workers are less likely to access the best jobs in areas with more other black Caribbeans. Some groups do benefit from more other minorities around, but it may also lead to workers getting stuck in the worst jobs. The right side shows that job quality is generally lower in occupations with more migrants. While the effect is only very small for the majority, the increased competition is more important for other migrants.

**DATA/METHODS**

We use the Understanding Society panel study to obtain 68,392 observations on working respondents aged 16-64 between 2009 and 2017. 5 large cluster with similar work conditions, based on 17 indicators of job quality [monetary rewards, work-life balance, intrinsic work quality, employment quality and job security] are identified. At the top end are high-quality jobs with good outcomes on all indicators; and at the bottom are bad jobs with poor outcomes on all measures. There are three further middling classes which each involve some compromise in work-life balance, job satisfaction, earnings or security.

We show the average gap for migrants and ethnic minorities compared to the white British (AME’s) first on average and then when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics, the sector and firm size; the socio-economic resources and ethnic diversity in the local area [Lower Super Output Area], obtained from the 2011 ONS census; and exposure to migrants in the occupation, obtained from the quarterly UKLFS.

A high concentration of minorities is often interpreted as problematic for the integration of migrants and minorities, either because this diversity exacerbates conflict over limited resources in the local area or because migrants and minorities in minority niches would have less contact with the majority which puts them at a long-term disadvantage. Evidence concerning these effects is scarce, however, partly because it is difficult to disentangle the effects of minority embeddedness as concentrated localities are often also more deprived. We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) on 16 European countries in the period of 2002 and 2014 to analyse how the economic position of majority and migrant residents is affected by living in an area they report as having many, rather than fewer, minority residents, estimated through propensity score matching.

**SUMMARY**

First, we show that majority and migrant residents of a minority niche area are less likely to be active on the labour market; employed (particularly strong effect), and work on jobs with slightly lower occupational status (International Socio-Economic Index, ranging from 16 lowest to 90 highest). However, once we account for the deprivation in the local area, these penalties all but disappear for the majority, but remain strong for migrants.

**FINDINGS**

Lack of contact with mainstream society matters a lot for explaining the disadvantage experienced by migrants. This is exacerbated by living in a minority concentrated areas. In hostile environments, where inter-ethnic contacts are less likely anyway, migrants do not face the same disadvantage of minority concentration, as shown in the figure below on employment probabilities. There may even be some benefit to the presence of other minorities in these circumstances. This hostility is measured by questions on how majority members feel about minorities.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

We show that, after accounting for the lower employability of those living in areas with many minorities, there is a penalty of those areas on migrants’ labour market outcomes, but not on those of the majority. While conflict and scarce resources play some role, a lack of contacts and ties with the majority seems the main driver of the migrant penalty. Yet, the penalty differs between regions. Living in areas with more minorities may have beneficial effects if the climate of reception is particularly negative. While we do not want to downplay the importance of getting valuable job information through inter-ethnic contact, the negative consequences of hostile reception have to be emphasized as well.
SUMMARY

Using data from the European Labour Force Survey from 2005 to 2008, we explore the impact of becoming EU citizen for immigrants involved in the 2007 European Union Eastern Enlargement (EUEE) on their labour market outcomes in receiving countries. We investigate whether the improved legal status gives immigrants a "citizenship premium" (Bevelander, DeVoretz, 2008), that is, whether it helps them to perform better in the labour market. Building on naturalisation studies, which show that becoming citizen of the destination country positively affect employment opportunities in "older" migration countries (Continental and Northern Europe), we try to understand if this is the case also for "new" Southern European migration countries. We find that the effect of the EU citizenship acquisition is not the same across European countries, as it supports employment opportunities in Continental Europe while, in Southern Europe, it has no effect on employment chances but it helps migrants to find more skilled jobs.

METHOD

It is not easy to assess the effect of naturalisation because it is a selective process: not all migrants can or opt to naturalize. Moreover, we do not know whether naturalisation causes better labour market outcomes or, on the contrary, whether citizenship acquisition is the effect of labour market success. Even if EU citizenship acquisition is not a condition as strong as naturalisation, similar methodological problems arise to assess its effect.

To overcome the above-mentioned issues, we exploit the 2007 EUEE in a "quasi-experimental" setting. That is, we compare the labour market outcomes of immigrants from new EU countries (Romanians and Bulgarians) with those of non-EU immigrants from other origins, before and after 2007. Immigrants from new EU countries are those "treated" by the enlargement policy, which improved their legal status. As nothing changes for other, they can ideally represent a "control group" which helps us to understand what should have happened to immigrants from new EU countries if they would not had become EU citizens.

THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS TRADE-OFF

In Western European countries, immigrants do no insert the same in the labour market. In "old" migration countries of Northern and Continental Europe, it is much more difficult for immigrants to find a job than for natives. However, even if more concentrated in low-skilled jobs, they have chances to access the skilled ones. On the contrary, in "new" migration countries of Southern Europe, immigrants and natives have similar employment chances but immigrants find only low-skilled jobs (Reyneri, Fullin, 2011).

The figure shows the employment opportunities-job quality trade-off across a selection of EU countries, before the crisis. On the Y-axis it is plotted the estimated difference in the probability for immigrants (compared to natives) to be employed. On the X-axis the difference in the probability for immigrants (compared to natives) to have a low skilled job is plotted.

Difference between immigrants’ & natives’ probability (gap)
a) to be employed (Y-axis)
b) to be in a low skilled job (X-axis)
(Calculation on EULFS data, 2005-2008 averages, controlled for main socio-demographic characteristics)
POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Labour market structure matters. The different structures and functioning of the labour markets across EU countries affect the economic incorporation of immigrants. In “old” migration countries, they are more penalised as regards employment opportunities, in “new” migration countries they are more segregated in low-skilled jobs. Consequently, one should not expect immigrants’ improved legal status to have the same effects across countries. As the 2007-EUEE shows, EU citizenship has increased employment opportunities for Romanians and Bulgarians in Central Europe, while it helped them to find better jobs in Southern Europe.

Bibliography
Bevelander & D. J. DeVoretz (Eds.) (2008), The Economics of Citizenship, Malmö: Malmö University.
Immigrant women originating from specific less economically developed migration countries show much lower activity and employment rates than native women in Western European destinations that must be accounted for. In Italy, for instance, women originating from predominantly Muslim, Hindu and Sikh countries show lower levels of labour market participation. The immigrant-native gap remains even after controlling for basic sociodemographic and human capital factors and is commonly addressed as an «ethnic penalty», attributed, more or less explicitly, to employers’ discriminatory behaviour. Ethnic penalties might, however, disappear once also controlling for immigrants’ different sociocultural backgrounds: as shown by Koopmans (2016), the lower labour market participation of Muslim immigrant women in a selection of Western European countries can be traced back to their traditional gender values and their low degree of sociocultural assimilation.

**BACKGROUND**

Immigrant women's employment patterns: disentangling the effects of ethnic origin, religious affiliation and religiosity

Raffaele Guetto, Ivana Fellini

**RESEARCH QUESTION 1**

Is it the country of origin or the belonging to a non-Christian religion that really matters?

Disentangling the effects of immigrants’ religious belonging and individual religiosity from that of country of origin is a difficult endeavour. Our first research hypothesis concerns the effect of religious affiliation controlling for immigrants’ areas of origin. We exploit the heterogeneity in ethnic and religious backgrounds of first-generation immigrant women with the same religious affiliation but coming from different origin countries, similarly to Heath and Martin (2013).

**DATA**

We use the “Condition & social integration of foreign citizens” survey carried out by ISTAT (Italian National Institute of statistics) in 2011-2012, sampling households with at least a foreign citizen. 8,212 first-generation immigrant women, without Italian citizenship at birth, aged between 15 and 60 when they first arrived in Italy and between 18 and 65 at the time of the interview, were selected.

**METHOD**

We implement a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression on immigrant women’s probability of having ever worked in the origin country and in Italy, with a set of dummies for belonging to different religions included in both models. Models are also augmented with dummies for the area of origin (Table 1). To test the influence of individual religiosity, the bivariate probit is estimated separately by religion and augmented with a factor score for religious commitment (Figure 1). Finally, multinomial logistic regressions on the probability of being employed, unemployed or inactive at the time of the interview are estimated, to test whether religious effects concern participation choices rather than unemployment risks (Table 2).

**1. Biprob models of having ever worked in origin and in Italy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation (ref. cat. Orthodox)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<td>-0.798***</td>
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<td>-0.0924</td>
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<td>0.115</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>EU15 &amp; HD</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>Latin America</td>
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Table 1 shows selected coefficients from biprob models controlling for age at arrival in Italy and education (years since migration, reasons for migrating, and language proficiency at arrival are only included in the model concerning work experience in Italy).

Muslim and other non-Christian immigrant women (e.g. Hindus and Sikhs) have substantially lower chances of labour market participation, in both the origin country and Italy, even after controlling for religions’ different ethnic compositions. Differences based on area of origin in women’s chances of having ever worked in Italy, which might be influenced by discrimination and other sources of disadvantage, are substantially smaller.

This project is funded under the Horizon 2020 programme of the European Commission
Figure 2 shows average marginal effects (with 95% C.I.) based on biprobit models that control for the same variables as in Table 1, implemented separately by religious denomination.

Results show that only for women belonging to Islam and other non-Christian religions the level of individual religiosity (importance of religion, frequency of praying and mass attendance) is relevant for having ever worked, both in the origin and in Italy.

Is individual religiosity relevant for immigrant women’s labour market participation decisions across all religious denominations?

The intensity of individual religiosity is also expected to exert a negative effect on immigrant women’s labour market participation, and this effect should be stronger among the most traditional religious affiliations as regards gender roles, such as Islam and Hinduism.

Cultural orientations matter and should be taken into account in the design of policies aimed at the socioeconomic integration of immigrant women, especially those originating from predominantly Muslim, Hindu and Sikh countries.

What explains the effects of religious belonging and religiosity?

Following theoretical arguments (Guetto et al., 2015), traditional attitudes toward the gender roles and family behaviours represent the mechanisms underlying religious effects on participation decisions (inactivity vs. activity), while neither religious belonging nor individual religiosity should matter for unemployment risks.

Models in Table 2 include controls for age, education, reasons for migrating, knowledge of Italian at arrival, and years since migration, but Model 2 is augmented with two factors scores for gender attitudes, marital status, and the number of cohabiting children as possible intervening variables.

Results show that religiosity and religious affiliation only influence participation decisions rather than unemployment risks, and their effects are partly accounted for by the intervening variables. On the contrary, ethnicity is strongly associated to unemployment risks: this may be (but not necessarily) linked to the existence of an «ethnic penalty» due to employers’ discriminatory behaviour.

Cultural orientations matter and should be taken into account in the design of policies aimed at the socioeconomic integration of immigrant women, especially those originating from predominantly Muslim, Hindu and Sikh countries.
RESEARCH QUESTION 1: What labour market differences do we observe by the migrant’s channel of migration?

Non-economic migrants have often been seen as an economic burden, which can result in tight rules and strict restrictions on the right to work. As opposed to economic migrants, non-economic migrants, especially refugees, have been described as being “...closer to “forced marriage” than the “chosen match” typical in economic migrations” (Dustmann et al., 2016, p.30). Yet, a few paradoxes exist since the higher qualifications of economic migrants do not always lead to substantially better outcomes despite stronger selection on a variety of characteristics.

EU13 migrants and economic migrants with and without a job have greater probability of employment compared to EU15 migrants while non-economic migrants do worse.

Estimated difference in probability of employment rather than non-employment from EU-15 migrants aged 16-64, from LFS AHM 2008 and 2014, controlling for individual and contextual factors.

RESEARCH QUESTION 2: Do migrants benefit equally from host country acquisitions? What is the effect of host country acquisitions on economic integration by type of migrant after accounting for selection on observed characteristics such as obtained qualifications?

Investing in host country acquisitions is an important route to integration. We address whether different types of migrants experience the same benefits from taking up further qualifications, naturalizing, or investing in language skills. This is not that straightforward as the migrants who have more host country skills may be more likely to do better on the labour market anyway.

RESEARCH QUESTION 3: Do highly skilled or low-skilled migrants benefit more from host country acquisitions?

That is to say, should countries invest only in highly-skilled migrants in terms of integration programmes (or is it worth sponsoring also the low-skilled)? Policies should ideally target specific groups with tailored integration solutions. If we know which is the group that benefits most, such policy solutions can be created.
DATA

We use data from the 2008 and 2014 EU LFS ad hoc modules to study the individual and contextual factors leading recent migrants to invest in host country acquisitions, and the extent to which these acquisitions then affect their employment probability and labour market transitions to and from work. We focus on the following host country acquisitions: language proficiency, attending a language course, citizenship, qualification in the host country. We compare, within our migrant type groups, two very similar otherwise individuals – but one has host country acquisitions, the other does not.

METHOD

We use a method called propensity score matching, where we compare each migrant with a certain type of host country human capital to 3 migrants of the same motivation who do not have that host country acquisition, but are very similar in terms of age, gender, urbanisation, qualifications, region of origin and family situation, as well as the conditions of arrival.

FINDINGS

The take up of country acquisitions can be quite high among non-economic migrants and depends on the investment. The following graph shows for example the take up of language course among types of migrants.

The importance of host country acquisitions: While family and refugee migrants are indeed less likely to be economically integrated in European societies, their labour market chances increase substantially with further investments in the host country such as language proficiency. We find that good language skills help all migrants in finding work, but these skills are particularly important in keeping non-economic migrants from lapsing into non-employment. Having attended a language course positively affects the employment probability of refugee migrants which highlights the importance of the integration efforts of the receiving society.

Context matters. We show that the institutional context does affect the probability of migrants investing in host country acquisitions. Migrants appear to be more likely to invest in a context with a more positive labour policy environment while negative initial conditions, such as a high unemployment rate or a low rate of decisions on asylum applications for refugees, reduce the further host country acquisitions as they create more uncertainty.

Programmes targeted at high/low-skilled migrants. In designing migration policies it is also important to note that further courses, training and good language skills primarily benefit the employment probability of economic migrants who already have higher qualifications. However, among non-economic migrants, even the low-skilled benefit from such acquisitions, which underscores the importance of the country's integration strategy.

The GEMM project delivers an assessment of labour market inequalities of migrants and minorities in Europe. By understanding the drivers of these inequalities and determining how institutional factors account for differences between countries, we provide recommendations of great practical and policy relevance. A cross-national harmonized field experiment on ethnic discrimination on the labour market in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Norway has been conducted. In all five countries job applications from fictitious job candidates to real job openings has been sent. The fictitious job candidates were either natives or had an immigrant background in one out of 52 different countries of origin. In all countries, clear differences in the call-back rates of the majority population and minority applicants have been found, confirming that minority applicants are discriminated against in the hiring process.

Between November 2016 and April 2018, we applied to almost 18,000 job vacancies with cover letters and CV’s of fictitious applicants. We sent one application per vacancy. To make applications comparable, all application materials were standardized with similar cover letters and CV’s across countries. We included applications from male and female job candidates, and took into account 52 different countries of ethnic origin for our minority candidates, ranging from Albania to Vietnam. In total, 25% of our applications were sent by applicants from the majority group and 25% were sent from two country-specific minority groups that are especially meaningful in the respective labour market. Specifically, Pakistani and Nigerians in Britain, Turks and Lebanese in Germany, Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, Pakistani and Somalis in Norway, and Ecuadorians and Moroccans in Spain. The remaining half of the applications are from applicants with a different ethnic origin, ranging from Europe, Africa, Asia to North and South America. Candidates’ ethnic background is foremost signalled by their name. In addition, the ethnic background is also signalled by their mother tongue in the resume and by a sentence about the origin of their family in the cover letter.

Next to ethnicity and gender, we randomly varied productivity-related information on the resumes, to test the effect of adding more personal information about applicants. We also included experimental manipulations to test discrimination based on religious affiliation and phenotype. In each country, we applied to vacancies in at least 6 occupations: cook, payroll clerk, software developer, receptionist, store assistant, and sales representative. We registered whether fictitious applicants received a positive call-back or invitation for a job interview from employers or not. Specifically, we coded personal requests for additional information, missed calls, and (pre-) invitations for a job interview as positive responses (call-back =1), no positive responses or no responses at all were coded 0. Ethnic discrimination in the labour market is hence indicated by differences in call-back rates between minority and majority applicants.
### Researchers involved

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* WP3 Leader
WP3 Field Experiments
5 Policy implications

1. The differences between the majority population and minority groups are systematically in favour of the first group. In other words, ethnic minority applicants have a lower overall probability of being called back for a job interview than majority group applicants. This difference in callback rates is statistically significant in all countries. However, the gap in callback rates between the majority and minority groups varies widely across countries. The data suggest that Norway and the United Kingdom are the countries with the highest levels of ethnic discrimination. In particular, applicants with Nigerian or Pakistani-sounding names in the United Kingdom, and with Somali-sounding names in Norway are approximately 40 to 45 percent less likely to be invited for an interview than native applicants, even when their education, work history and personal characteristics are the same. Meanwhile, discrimination against Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands is comparatively lower. In specific, Turkish and Moroccan applicants have a circa 30 percent lower chance of being called back for a job interview, compared to majority group applicants. Furthermore, Turks and Lebanese candidates in Germany, and Moroccan applicants in Spain have callback rates that are around 18 to 25 percent lower than the majority group. Spain has the lowest discrimination rates, and we note the difference between Ecuadorian applicants and applicants from the majority group is not statistically significant.

2. Ethnic discrimination varies greatly across ethnic minority groups. The findings suggest that minority groups with a larger cultural distance to the majority population have lower chances to be invited to job interviews. Drawing on previous research that relates ethnic hierarchies in social distance to differences in cultural values, the field experiment studies whether the level of cultural distance between minority groups and the native population can explain ethnic differences in hiring decisions. That is, we relate callback rates to the cultural distance between minorities’ countries of origin and the receiving society. Previous research has shown that societies have their own ethnic hierarchies and that the more culturally distant minority groups are from the native group, the lower they are ranked in the hierarchy. Secular values place less emphasis on religion, the traditional family values and authority, while emancipative values reflect how strongly people claim control over their own lives, e.g. tolerance towards divorce, abortion, and homosexuality (choice) or gender equality values. The results thus far show that the more the values in origin countries deviate from the receiving society in terms of secular and emancipative values or shares of Muslim population, the lower the likelihood that employers signal interest in minority candidates’ application for a job.
3. Ethnic discrimination is **multidimensional**: it varies across occupations, and destination countries. Comparing discrimination between occupations, we find the weakest penalties find the largest penalties towards minority-background candidates among cooks and other less-skilled and low customer contact professions, such as plumber and carpenters (not included in every country of study). This might indicate that ethnic discrimination is more prevalent in occupations requiring less education but the results are somewhat patchy as some less-skilled occupations such as store assistant also show relatively low rates of discrimination.

4. **The gender aspect of ethnic discrimination**: The field experiment reveals that in three of the five countries studied (Germany, The Netherlands and Spain) there is an overall penalty towards male candidates in the initial stages of the hiring process, i.e. the probability of being invited to an interview. The gender effect is indistinguishable from zero in the remaining two countries (Norway and the UK). It is the strongest, and most easily detectable, in Germany. This male penalty varies by occupation: It is significant among store assistants, payroll clerks and receptionists, while undetected among sales representatives, software developers and cooks.

In addition, the overall penalty associated with signaling a minority background seems to affect male and female candidates equally, with some differences among certain minority groups and occupations. For instance, while noted that among payroll clerks, female candidates receive significantly higher callbacks than male candidates, they also experience significantly more severe ethnic penalties than male candidates. On a similar note, female candidates, while receiving higher callback than males in the Netherlands and Spain, are penalized significantly stronger than male candidates when signaling a background from Latin America. In Norway, an opposite pattern is found: While there are no gender differences in callbacks overall, male candidates from Africa are strongly discriminated against, compared to female candidates from Africa. Overall, however, we conclude that there are no systematic gender differences in ethnic discrimination: Male and female candidates are penalized equally with respect to signaling an minority background.

Thus, while both male and female candidates experience ethnic discrimination to a similar extent, there seems to be a “double” penalty for minority-background men in some occupations and for some ethnic groups. The results show an overall hierarchy where native female candidates come out on top, followed by native males, minority females, and minority males at the bottom. Regarding policy discussions, it is important to note that these findings apply to the early stages of the hiring process, and for relatively young applicants (to be further documented in the paper on gender differences).

5. **The effect of signalling skills on resumes is not effective in reducing ethnic discrimination**. It has often been suggested that employers will discriminate less against ethnic minorities if they would have more production-relevant information from individual job applicants. Having more personal information about labour productivity would presumably reduce the use of group images and stereotypes and thus lessen the tendency to discriminate. We tested whether discrimination occurs less if job applicants add more information about their social skills (e.g. describing oneself as a team player, friendly, and reliable), competencies (e.g. having more tasks and responsibility), and the applicants’ school grades (e.g. mentioning good final grades). However, the results indicate that mentioning extra tasks and responsibilities,
providing extra information about social skills, and mentioning good final grades neither increase callbacks nor reduce ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, there are little indications that the effects of adding more social skills, competences, and grades vary between countries and minority groups.
INTRODUCTION

This brief focuses on the overall patterns of results from the field experiments in the GEMM project.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Overall patterns

The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) differs between the five countries. While it is relatively low in Spain (13 percent), the UK (17 percent), and Norway (28 percent), the call-back rate in the Netherlands is much larger with 46 percent and in Germany it even reaches 48 percent. This may be explained by the very high demand for labour in Germany and the Netherlands.

1. Discrimination of minority applicants

Clear evidence of ethnic discrimination

- We find clear differences in the call-back rates of majority and minority applicants, confirming that overall, minority applicants are discriminated against in the hiring process. Applicants from the majority group receive more call-backs from employers compared to (equally qualified) minority applicants. The difference in call-back rate is significant in all countries. The overall discrimination ratio is 1.31, indicating that minority applicants need to send about thirty percent more applications than majority applicants to have a similar likelihood of receiving a positive response from employers.

- The differences between countries partly reflect the distribution of the minority groups included in our study. In our comparative design we included a wide range of groups with different ethnic origin, and in addition focused in each country on two specific minority groups that are especially meaningful in the respective labour market. As 25% of all applications within a country are from those two minority groups, this affects the overall rate of discrimination within each country.

2 Differences in discrimination between ethnic groups

Large differences in ethnic discrimination between applicants from different countries of origin

- There are considerable differences in the extent of discrimination between applicants from different origin regions. Overall, we find that compared to other minority applicants, applicants from Western Europe and the US have relatively more chance to get a positive response from an employer. In most countries this also holds for applicants from Eastern Europe and Russia, and South-East and East Asia. On the other hand, applicants with a Latin America, Middle East and North African (MENA region) or (other) African background receive overall relative less positive responses from employers.

- There are large differences in the extent of discrimination between minority applicants from different countries of origin. There are some systematic differences here. For example, in most destination countries applicants from South Korea, India, or the Netherlands have above-average call-back rates. Applicants from countries such as Uganda, Egypt, or Iraq, by contrast, are consistently on the lower end of the call-back hierarchy. However, there also are big differences across destination countries with regard to the ranking of specific origin groups.

- Although minority applicants are overall treated less favourable than majority applicants, there are some ethnic groups which even have a better chance to receive a call-back from employers. For instance, in the UK, applicants with an Irish or Indian background have a higher call-back rate than majority UK applicants.

- The overall differences in discrimination between minority groups indicate a pattern of cultural distance. That is, we find that larger differences in cultural values (with regard to secular and emancipative values or shares of Muslim population) between the population of the destination country and the country of origin, correspond with a lower likelihood that applicants from this country of origin will receive a positive response from an employer.
3 Gender discrimination

No evidence of discrimination of women

- Overall, we find no evidence of discrimination of women in the five European countries. Instead, as far as discrimination exists, it is men who are less likely to receive a call-back from employers. More specific, in three of the five countries studied (Germany, The Netherlands and Spain) there is an overall penalty towards male candidates in the initial stages of the hiring process, i.e., the probability of being invited to an interview. The gender effect is indistinguishable from zero in the remaining two countries (Norway and The UK).
- Men are discriminated in typically female dominated occupations, such as payroll clerks, receptions and store assistants. Women are not discriminated when they apply for jobs as software developers, a typical male dominated occupation.

No evidence of intersectionality between gender and ethnic discrimination

Does ethnic discrimination vary by gender? Previous studies provided mixed conclusion regarding the question whether females from ethnic minority groups are relatively more discriminated than males from ethnic minority groups.

- Our results show that ethnic discrimination does not vary systematically with gender. While female candidates in general receive higher call-backs than male candidates, both sexes are penalized equally with respect to signaling a minority background. Hence, our findings do not support the idea of a “double burden” facing minority women, or conversely the notion of gendered ethnic stereotypes additionally penalizing male candidates.
- There is some heterogeneity across occupations: Among receptionists and payroll clerks, occupations which in most countries are female-dominated, minority women are penalized more severely than men.

4 Racial discrimination

In three European countries - Germany, the Netherlands and Spain - we additionally carried out a comparative field experiment on the impact of phenotypes, as indicated by the photographs of our fictitious applications. We examined the average difference in call back rates across four ‘racial’ groups (‘White’, ‘Dark-Skinned Caucasian’, ‘Asian’ and ‘Black’) comprising eight different photographs for each gender carefully matched in dimensions of attractiveness and likeability.

- We find evidence of ‘racial’ discrimination, net of ethnic origin in all three countries. Averaging across the three countries studied, ‘racial’ minorities have to send roughly between 13% (Dark-Skinned Caucasians) to 23% (Blacks) more CVs to receive a call-back than ‘White minorities’ net of region of ancestry.
- Racial discrimination is significantly lower in Spain and seems highest in the Netherlands, where Black minority applicants are roughly 30% less likely to receive a call-back than identical White minority applicants.
- Applicants’ phenotype does not influence employers’ responses independently of applicants’ ethnicity. For example, in the Netherlands and Germany, we find White applicants of Western Europe or US ancestry receive twice as many call-backs than Black applicants of MENA ancestry, while Black applicants of Western European/US ancestry do not seem to be discriminated against. Similarly, in Spain, the Dark-Skinned Caucasian phenotype is discriminated against if applicants have MENA ancestry but not if they have Western/US ancestry. This suggest there is intersectionality between racial discrimination (phenotype) and ethnic discrimination (region of origin).
- Only in the Netherlands we find evidence suggestive of racial hierarchies in employers’ responses to minority applicants of non-Western ancestry. This means call-backs for these applicants tend to decrease by phenotype following the following order: White/Dark-Skin-Caucasian/Asian/Black.
5 Religious discrimination

More discrimination of applicants with a headscarf

In our study, we signalled the religious affiliation of our fictitious applicants with their voluntary work that is either conducted in a civic association (for our secular applicants) or in a religious (Christian, Muslim, Hindu or Buddhist) association.

- Minority applicants with a Muslim affiliation have a lower chance of receiving a positive call back from employers. There is a clear negative effect for female applicants in Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, and for male applicants in the UK, the Netherlands and Norway.

- The penalty for female Muslim applicants in the Netherlands and Germany seems to be driven by those wearing a headscarf in their CV picture. In fact, disclosing a Muslim affiliation does not have any negative effect for females (from Muslim countries) without headscarf, while the penalty associated to wearing a headscarf is substantial, particularly in Germany.

- Hence, the mere fact of being Muslim does not trigger discrimination for female Muslim applicants in most countries (except Norway). Rather, those who wear a headscarf are more discriminated in Germany and (although not significantly) in the Netherlands.

- Note that we only were able to test for an effect of wearing a headscarf in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, as we included pictures of applicants only in these countries. In addition, in our experiment we only investigated the first phase of the hiring procedure, namely the selection of applicants for a job interview. It might be that wearing a headscarf also triggers discrimination in countries such as Norway and Great Britain (where we did not send pictures), but that this is not visible at this stage of the application process, but only when applicants actually appear for a job interview.

- Whereas we do find clear negative effects of disclosing a Muslim affiliation, we find no effect of a Christian, a Hindu or a Buddhist affiliation for minorities. The only exception to this pattern are Buddhist and Hindu males in Norway, who receive more positive call-backs compared to secular applicants.

- Among applicants from the national majority group, we find only evidence of religious discrimination in two countries. In Norway, applicants with a Christian affiliation have a lower call-back rate than non-religious applicants. In the Netherlands, a similar pattern emerges but only for female applicants.

6 The effect of the amount of information about the applicant

Discrimination is only marginally reduced when more information about the applicant is available

According to statistical discrimination theory (SDT), discrimination is due to information deficiencies. When employers have little information about job applicants’ true productivity, they will base their decisions partly on information about groups’ average productivity or group stereotypes. Accordingly, adding more relevant information to a resume is expected to reduce discrimination in hiring. However, our results show overall only marginal effects in line with SDT.

- Adding more relevant personal information to the resume did not significantly reduce discrimination of minority applicants compared to majority applicants. Although adding more personal information diminishes discrimination slightly, the difference is not significant. Hence, the direct impact of more personal information is limited.

We also examined whether differences in discrimination between ethnic groups are related to group characteristics, such as the level of labour participation, educational attainment, language distance, and group size. According to SDT, employers would partly rely on information regarding average productivity characteristics or stereotypes of groups. Hence, one would expect more discrimination towards ethnic groups which on average show lower levels of labour participation and educational attainment, or with a language in the country of origin that is more dissimilar to the language in the country of residence. Finally, one would expect less discrimination towards ethnic groups with a larger share in the (labour force) population, as there would be less uncertainty among employers about the productivity of such applicants. Consequently, applicants from larger minority groups would accordingly be less discriminated compared to (equally qualified) applicants from the majority group. A positive effect shows that the higher the score on this group characteristic, the more a minority group is discriminated compared to the majority group. We find some evidence for these hypotheses deduced from SDT. In line with SDT, we find in two countries (Norway and the Netherlands) that individual job applicants from minority groups are more likely to be discriminated against when the overall employment rate of their ethnic group is lower (i.e. the proportion of non-employed is larger).
Interestingly, and also in line with SDT, these effects seem to be weaker when fictitious applicants sent more personal information, thus supporting SDT. Furthermore, in Germany, we find an overall negative effect of the relative size of a minority group. That is, members of smaller ethnic groups are apparently more discrimination. However, additional analyses show – in contrast to SDT – that this is only the case when more personal information was included. Likewise, we find in Germany that groups characterized by higher unemployment rates seem to be more discriminated against, but again – in contrast to SDT – only when more personal information was included. Finally, in contrast to SDT, we do not find that ethnic discrimination is significantly associated with the level of educational attainment or language distance. In sum, we find only limited support for the theoretical notion that employers use these objective group characteristics in their evaluation of individual job applicants.

7 The effect of applicants’ warmth and competence signals.

Do employers discriminate less when applicants signal warmth and competence in their resume?

Employers base their hiring decisions partly on signals of (majority or minority) group membership. Previous research shows that two types of information are of particular importance when people form impressions of others: information about others’ intentions (i.e. their warmth, communion, or morality) and about their capacity to reach their goals (i.e. competence, agency, or power) - often referred to as the ‘Big Two’ of social perception. We randomly varied competence and warmth by including a personal statement in the resume and cover letter.

- Overall, signalling competence increases the likelihood of receiving a positive response from employers. Signalling (only) warmth has no effect.
- However, the effect of competence differs between majority and minority applicants: majority members benefit more from competence signals than minority candidates. Hence, our results contradict statistical discrimination theory and are instead in line with psychological research on stereotype-consistent information. In most countries, majority applicants benefit from a warmth or competence signal in their resume. However, minority applicants benefit less.
- We also find variation across destination countries, with the pattern of results in Germany strongly deviating from the general finding. This might point to the German exceptionalism in application procedures. In Germany, job candidates have to hand in a large amount of information, including copies of school graduation and training certificates. Given this objective information, self-reports of competence and warmth may be of less importance for employers or they may even evoke reversed effects.

8 Formalization of HR procedures

To analyse whether and how discrimination varies across firms based on specific organizational-level characteristics (e.g. firm size), we are constrained by the type of information that was available on the online job platforms from which we sampled the job openings for the field experiment. This information is often limited and, where available, poorly comparable across countries. Given these constraints, we focus here on only one factor that is often discussed in the literature on how to reduce bias in organizational decision-making: the formalization of HR procedures.

Formalized hiring procedures are expected to decrease bias in hiring decisions by making the rules and structure of the hiring process transparent. In turn, transparency should make managers accountable for their decisions. We relied on an indirect measure of formalization to test whether discrimination is lower in organizations that have formalized hiring procedures. Our proxy for formalization measures whether the applicant received a confirmation of receipt after the application was received. These are messages like "Thank you for your interest in [firm]. Your application is under consideration for the position [job]. Interviews will start from [date]". This variable can be calculated for all countries except Spain, where the online platform used for sampling job openings automatically sent a confirmation of receipt to all applicants with an automated message. Admittedly, this is a very indirect proxy of formalization, which partly captures the presence of a HR department with a standardized communication policy for recruitment. It also correlates with firm size: in Germany, where information on firm size is available, the two are positively correlated ($r=0.251$, $p<0.01$). With these caveats in mind, the analyses show that in Germany, the Netherlands and Norway the disadvantage of minority applicants relative to the majority applicants in the respective country is reduced in organizations that adopt formalized HR procedures. In the UK (not shown), this is however not the case. We find the same result, whether we look at the chance to get a (any) call-back from employers (model 1 and 2), or stricter, at the chance to get an invitation for a job interview.
INTRODUCTION

This brief focuses on the results of the GEMM field experiments for the United Kingdom.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Here below, we report the differences in call-back rates for the majority group and for minority groups from different regions of origin. Next, we present the call-back rates for specific minority groups that are especially meaningful for this country given the respective labour market and the debate on integration. In our design, these minority groups were therefore oversampled: 25% of all applications in each country were from fictitious applicants from these specific minority groups.

The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) is 17 percent in UK.

In Great Britain, as Figure 1 shows, all the main groupings of ethnic minority applicants received lower call-back rates than the majority group (the white British) did. One notable finding is that the rate for the Western Europe and US grouping was only slightly lower than that for the majority group, and the difference in rates was not statistically significant (as can be seen, the 95% confidence interval for this minority overlaps the white British average).

All the other minority groupings receive significantly lower call-back rates than the white British. Moreover, the call-back rates for the Latin America, South Asia, MENA and Africa groups are all significantly lower than that of the Western Europe and US grouping. The Eastern Europe and Russia grouping, and the South-East and East Asia groupings have call-back rates which are somewhat closer to that of the Western Europe and US grouping (their 95% confidence intervals overlapping with the average of the WE and US grouping). However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all six of these groupings experience the same rate of discrimination (their 95% confidence intervals all overlap with the overall average of the six groups combined).

The addition of statistical controls for gender, occupation and religion confirms this account, namely:

- all minority groups, except the Western Europe and US group, experience significant discrimination compared with the majority group
- all minority groupings other than the Western Europe and US grouping experience rates of discrimination which do not differ significantly from each other.

The results for the two oversampled groups, Nigerian and Pakistani, are also in line with these conclusions. Thus, the raw call-back rates (Figure 2) for both these groups are significantly much lower than that of the majority group but are not significantly different from each other.
These results are closely in line with the most recent previous set of field experiments in Great Britain, conducted for the Department of Work and Pensions (Wood et al., 2009). This study found that all five minority groups tested – the Black Caribbean, African, Indian, Pakistani and Chinese groups – experienced significant discrimination relative to the majority group but did not differ significantly from each other in their rate of discrimination. Our results are also closely in line with an even earlier British study conducted by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE, 1997) which found that a west European group – the Irish – did not experience significant discrimination relative to the British majority group. The GEMM study extends these earlier studies by showing that the Eastern Europe and Russia grouping, together with the Middle East and North Africa grouping, also experience significant discrimination of similar magnitude to that experienced by the black and Asian groupings.

Turning to occupational differences, most of the occupations tested showed lower positive call-back rates for minorities (all groups combined including the WE and US grouping), as shown in Figure 3. The one exception was the electrician occupational grouping, but in Britain the number of vacancies for electricians to which applications were sent was rather low, and the confidence intervals are correspondingly large. The results suggest that skilled occupations such as software developer may experience less discrimination than less-skilled occupations (a result in line with a recent meta-analysis of field experiments (Quillian et al., 2017), but the results are somewhat patchy as some less-skilled occupations such as store assistant also show relatively low rates of discrimination.
Moving to policy implications, one striking finding from the GEMM study in Great Britain is that current rates of discrimination are very similar in magnitude to those found in previous British field experiments conducted thirty or forty years ago (Jowell & Prescott-Clarke 1970, Brown & Gay 1985). This strongly suggests that current legislation and policy (such as the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 2010 Equality Act) have not been able to make a substantial difference to minorities’ risks of experiencing discrimination. New policies could take the form of

- strengthening existing legislation and enforcement, for example by increasing the fines on firms which are found to have discriminated against complainants or by increasing the probability of detection (for example by increasing the powers of the EHRC to investigate firms with low rates of minority employment),
- mandating anonymous (name-blind) selection procedures in public sector organisations and contractors carrying out public-sector functions
- requiring firms to monitor and publish their ethnic composition (alongside that with respect to other ‘protected groups’ as specified by the 2010 Act)
- rewarding firms who demonstrate good practice and outcomes in terms of equal treatment of protected groups
This brief focuses on the results of the GEMM field experiments in Spain.

**Evidence and Analysis**

Here, we report the differences in call-back rates for the majority group and for minority groups from different regions of origin. Next, we present the call-back rates for specific minority groups that are especially meaningful for this country given the respective labour market and the debate on integration. In our design, these minority groups were therefore oversampled: 25% of all applications in each country were from fictitious applicants from these specific minority groups. The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) is 13 percent in Spain. Of the five countries included in the harmonised field experiment, Spain is the one where differences in call-back rates between the majority group (15%) and the minority groups combined (13%) are the smallest (call-back ratio= 1.15, p.<.05).

Further inspection of the Spanish data reveals a significantly lower call-back rate for majority applicants (i.e. native-ancestry applicants with Spanish names) in Catalonia. Post fieldwork robustness tests suggest majority applicants with Catalan names would have received significantly higher call-backs than majority applicants with Spanish names in Catalonia. Since vacancies in Catalonia account for over a quarter of all vacancies in the Spanish experiment, using Spanish names as the majority reference in Catalonia could potentially lower discrimination estimates for the whole of Spain. Yet discrimination estimates for Spain remain comparatively low even if we remove all observations from Catalonia from the analysis (call-back ratio 1.25, P.>.05). Hence our conclusion that Spain is a low discrimination country is not artificially driven by lower call-backs for majority applicants in Catalonia.

As shown in Figure 1, applicants of African, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and Latin American ancestry are the ones with the lowest call-back rates (8.3%, 11.6% and 11.7%, respectively) in Spain. We note applicants of African ancestry have to send almost twice as many CVs as majority applicants to get a call-back.

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**Figure 1.** Call-back rates in Spain for applicants from majority group and minority groups, by region of origin.
The results for the two oversampled groups, Moroccan ancestry and Ecuadorian-ancestry applicants, suggest lower call-back rates for both groups yet the difference with natives is only statistically significant for Moroccan ancestry applicants (p<.05).

We can further inquire about Spanish employers’ responses to different applications by looking into differences in call-back by applicants’ phenotype. This is possible in Spain since attaching a photograph to the résumé is a standard procedure for job applications. Results shown in Figure 3 suggest applicants of Middle East and North African ancestry (MENA) are discriminated against if they have a dark-skinned Caucasian phenotype (DSC) or a Black phenotype (p.<.1 and p.<.01, respectively) but not if they have a White phenotype. Interestingly, phenotype does not seem to have a similar traction in the case of Latin American ancestry applicants, where differences in call-back rates across different phenotypes are generally small and not statistically significant.

Figure 2. Call-back rates in Spain for applicants from majority group and specific minority groups.

Figure 3. Differences in call-back rates by phenotype for applicants of MENA and Latin American ancestry.
Finally, it is worth noting that the differences in call-back rate between applicants from the majority and the minority group are not statistically significant in most of the occupations considered with the sole exception of sales representatives (p.<.1) (see Figure 4).

In conclusion, although there is evidence of systematic discrimination against minority applicants in Spain, the magnitude of discrimination seems comparatively low when compared to the rest of the countries of the GEMM study. Finding comparatively low levels of discrimination in Spain is actually a puzzling finding. According to classical theoretical accounts of inter-group conflict and prejudicial attitudes (see e.g. Allport 1954; Blalock 1967) we should expect both anti-immigrant sentiments and discrimination rates to be particularly high, not low, in Spain, and this for the following two reasons: First, between 1997 and 2007 Spain received roughly 5 million immigrants. This led to a huge increase in the immigration rate, which soared from around 2 per cent to roughly 15 per cent. Such a massive and rapid increase in the size of ethnic minorities should have increased feelings of perceived threat amongst Spanish natives. Also, of all the countries participating in this study, Spain is the one most severely hit by economic recession. Between 2008 and 2013, for example, the unemployment rate soared from 8 per cent to over 24 per cent. The Spanish route out of recession has implied a painful process of internal devaluation, which has increased inequality, poverty rates and job precariousness. The combination of a rapid growth in the immigration rate followed by severe economic recession would have led most specialists to expect particularly high levels of anti-immigrant sentiments and discrimination.

Figure 4. Call-back rates in Spain for applicants from majority group and minority groups by occupation.
This brief focuses on the results of the GEMM field experiments for Germany. The German team participated in a cross-nationally harmonized filed experiment (correspondence test) on ethnic discrimination in hiring. That means, we sent application documents from fictitious job candidates (25% of them being natives and 75 percent with an immigrant background from one out of 52 different countries of origin) to real job openings in eight occupations (two high-skilled and eight low- to medium-skilled occupations). To detect ethnic discrimination in hiring, we finally compared employers’ responses (i.e. positive or negative) to applications between job candidates of different backgrounds.

Here we report the differences in call-back rates for the majority group and for minority groups from different regions of origin. Next, we present the call-back rates for specific minority groups that are especially meaningful for this country given the respective labour market and the debate on integration. In our design, these minority groups were therefore oversampled: 25% of all applications in each country were from fictitious applicants from these specific minority groups.

The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) is 49 percent in Germany: this may be explained by the very high demand for labour in Germany.

In Germany, as Figure 1 shows, the level of discrimination against minorities varies across origin groups. Whereas job applicants of Eastern European and Russian background receive a positive response almost as often as German natives, the likelihood of receiving a positive response is much lower for all other minority groups. Surprisingly, the response rate for job candidates from the Western European and US group is lower than that for the Eastern European and Russian group and almost identical to the response rate for applicants of Latin American and African origin. Regression analyses confirm response rates to be significantly lower for ethnic minorities originating from Western Europe and the US, South Asia, South East and East Asia, MENA countries and African countries compared to Germans without foreign roots (p<.05, respectively). When controlling for job applicants gender, religion, and occupation, the differences between groups become smaller.
As shown in Figure 2, the response rates for the two oversampled groups, Turkish and Lebanese minorities are significantly below the average response rate for Germans without foreign roots ($p<.001$ and $p<.01$, respectively) and they are lower (but not significantly different from) the response rate for other ethnic minorities.

With respect to differences between occupations, the German results point to strong consistency (see Figure 3). Albeit absolute call-back rates strongly vary across occupations, the level of discrimination hardly varies across occupations.
In addition to country of origin, job candidates’ phenotype and religion matter. Ethnic minority candidates with non-White phenotypes \((p<.01)\) and Muslim faith \((p<.01)\) are particularly strongly discriminated against.

The German job market is different from all the other countries tested the GEMM project, because in Germany job candidates have to hand in much more material when applying for a job, including resume photos and copies of school and job training certificates. Whereas adding photos gives rise to racial discrimination (since response rates were significantly lower for job candidates with Southern-European / Northern-African, Black or Asian phenotypes as compared to Northern-European / Central-European phenotypes), adding no photos also significantly reduces response rates. School and job training certificates provide relevant productivity-related information and are therefore predicted to reduce the likelihood of statistical discrimination. Indeed, the results of previous correspondence studies suggest that the level of discrimination observed in German correspondence studies is relatively low (Zschirnt & Ruedin, 2016). In support of this notion, the level of discrimination observed in the German GEMM study is low to medium: it is much lower than in Norway and the UK, similar to the level observed in the Netherlands and higher than the level found in Spain. In conclusion:

- German employers discriminate against job candidates of foreign origin; the average gap is ten percent points.
- Ethnic minority candidates with non-White phenotypes and Muslim faith are particularly strongly discriminated against.
- The level of discrimination does not systematically vary between high-skilled and low-skilled occupation or between occupations high and low in customer contact.
- In comparison to other Western European destination countries, the level of discrimination observed in Germany is medium to low.
This brief focuses on the results of the GEMM field experiments for the Netherlands

**EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS**

Here, we report the differences in call-back rates for the majority group and for minority groups from different regions of origin. Next, we present the call-back rates for specific minority groups that are especially meaningful for this country given the respective labour market and the debate on integration. In our design, these minority groups were therefore oversampled: 25% of all applications in each country were from fictitious applicants from these specific minority groups.

The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) is 46 percent in the Netherlands: this may be explained by the very high demand for labour in the Netherlands.

Figure 1 displays differences in call-back rates between minority groups with different regions of origin. Majority applicants have the highest probability to receive a call-back from employers. The likelihood to receive a call-back is somewhat lower for applicants with a European or US background and even lower for applicants with a Latin American or an Asian background. However, compared to the majority group, these differences are not significant, with the exception of the lower call-back rate for applicants from South-East and East Asia. Finally, job candidates with a MENA or African background have the lowest probability to be contacted by employers and this is significantly lower than for majority applicants. Although differences in call-back rates become slightly smaller, a similar empirical pattern is found in multivariate analyses controlling for gender, religion, and occupation. Hence, although not all differences between groups are significant, this indicates the existence of an ethnic hierarchy in the Netherlands.

*Figure 1. Call-back rates in the Netherlands for applicants from majority group and minority groups, by region of origin.*
Figure 2 presents the call-back rates for the oversampled ethnic groups in the Netherlands. These results, too, are in line with the notion of an ethnic hierarchy. Job applicants with a Polish or Bulgarian background have only slightly (and not significantly) less chance to receive a call-back compared to majority applicants. However, job applicants with a Moroccan or Turkish background are strongly and significantly less likely to be contacted than majority applicants. The finding that Moroccan and Turkish minorities are strongly discriminated in the Dutch labour market is in line with previous field experimental research in the Netherlands (e.g. Andriessen, et al., 2012; Blommaert, et al., 2014; Bovenkerk, et al., 1995; Van de Berg, et al., 2017). Interestingly, and in contrast with the findings of our field experiment in which we included more groups, previous research did not detect substantial differences in discrimination rates between minority groups (e.g. Andriessen, et al., 2012; Panteia, 2015).

Figure 2 also presents the call-back rates for job applicants with a Surinamese and Antillean background (similar results are obtained in multivariate analyses). The number of applications are smaller for these groups, hence the large confidence intervals. Job applicants with a Surinamese background seem to have lower chances to receive a call-back than majority applicants but higher chances to be contacted than applicants with an Antillean, Moroccan or Turkish background (these differences are however not significant). Qualitative research among Dutch employers shows a similar ranking of ethnic groups in terms of hiring preferences (Nievers, 2010). However, due to the low number of observations, it is however difficult to draw any firm conclusions upon these results.

Finally, Figure 3 shows the call-back rates for majority and minority job applicants per occupation. Although majority applicants are more likely to receive a call-back than minority applicants, there are only limited differences between occupations. Only for cooks and software developers, significant discrimination against minority candidates was discovered. Previous research on hiring discrimination in the Netherlands also finds no or also little systematic variation in discrimination rates across occupations (e.g. Andriessen, et al., 2012; Blommaert, et al., 2014).
In conclusion, the results indicate medium to high levels of ethnic discrimination in the Netherlands. In particular, there is evidence for the existence of an ethnic hierarchy in which especially African and MENA groups and applicants with a Turkish or Moroccan origin are more discriminated against. As the level of ethnic discrimination hardly varies across occupation, these findings moreover suggest that ethnic discrimination is linked with widespread negative beliefs or stereotypes about ethnic minority groups.
This brief focuses on the results of the GEMM field experiments for Norway.

**Evidence and Analysis**

Here, we report the differences in call-back rates for the majority group and for minority groups from different regions of origin. Next, we present the call-back rates for specific minority groups that are especially meaningful for this country given the respective labour market and the debate on integration. In our design, these minority groups were therefore oversampled: 25% of all applications in each country were from fictitious applicants from these specific minority groups.

The mean call-back rate (for all applicants, irrespective of gender, ethnic origin, etc.) is 24 percent in Norway. Figure 1 shows the predicted call-back rates, for applicants from the majority group as well as minority groups categorized by seven regions or origin. The figures indicate an ethnic hierarchy in employer evaluation of candidates: European candidates, broadly construed, experience less discrimination compared to signalling a background from Latin America or South Asia. Candidates from the MENA countries and Africa (including the Somali group, see below), make up the lowest end of this hierarchy: These candidates experience the highest levels of ethnic discrimination.

Figure 2 shows the same predicted call-backs for the majority group, the two oversampled groups, and a grouped estimate for other minorities. As the graph shows, applicants signalling a Pakistani origin face significant discrimination when compared to the majority. This finding is in line with previous experimental studies of the Norwegian labour market (see e.g. Midtbøen, 2016; Birkelund et. al. 2017). The same holds true for candidates signalling a Somali origin, and the estimated gap is even larger for this group. While no previous experimental studies have included Somali origin as a group of study, the findings are unsurprising given the labour market disadvantage this group faces in general. The heterogeneous group of "other" migrants fare slightly better than the Pakistani group.

![Figure 1. Call-back rates in Norway for applicants from majority group and minority groups, by region of origin.](image)

![Figure 2. Call-back rates in Norway for applicants from majority group and specific minority groups.](image)
Figure 3 shows the predicted call-backs for the majority candidates and a pooled minority group by occupation, and shows signs of ethnic discrimination in all occupations although the gap in call-back is not always significant. The majority-minority gap is largest and significant among plumbers, carpenters, and payroll clerks. With the exception of the last mentioned, these are low-skilled, male-dominated occupations: This might be indicative that ethnic discrimination is more prevalent in occupations requiring less education. However, the last of the mentioned occupations, payroll clerk, stands out in this regard.

Figure 1. Call-back rates in Norway for applicants from majority group and minority groups by occupation.
WP4

The main aim of WP4 is to examine the ‘lived experiences’ of migration in relation to the project overall objective ‘Managing Mobility of Human Capital as a Driver of Growth’. While most studies concentrate on the migration outcomes once migrants are in the country of reception, the research design of WP4 allows to capture the dynamic process of mobility in its entirety: from the multi-layered nature of migration decisions through the various mobility channels to the diverse economic, cultural, political and social outcomes for individuals and societies. This is achieved by studying three groups with different positions in the mobility process: experts from public and private recruiting agencies, prospective migrants preparing their departure to a European country within one year and actual migrants – that is people who have migrated for work and have lived for at least two years in the receiving country. The strength of the WP comes also from the study of migration motivations and mobility experiences as embedded in the specific social contexts of the countries of departures and the countries of arrival. The countries selected for the fieldwork represented three groups: traditionally receiving migrants such as Germany and the UK, countries traditionally sending migrants, such as Bulgaria and Romania, and countries which at present are both receiving and sending migrants such as Italy and Spain. In addition, the WP addresses the interplay between individual, contextual and institutional factors highlighting those that contribute to the successful integration of migrants and efficient use of human capital in Europe.

The fieldwork took about 8 months – from November 2016 till June 2018. The interview schedules were translated into the local languages, several pilot interviews were conducted to check their feasibility and then discussed by the research teams. The interviews were conducted by members of the research teams who were trained in qualitative methodology. Using the commonly agreed sampling design, the interview guides and letters of informed consent, the six teams from Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK conducted 236 interviews-in-depth in total. The interviewees were selected following a quota sampling along the following criteria:

- 40 experts from recruiting agencies who were owners or employees of such organizations, both state and private, and working on different levels of the organizational hierarchy.
- 42 prospective migrants who were people that planned to leave the country of origin in less than 12 months and had made some preparatory steps.
- 154 actual migrants who were people who had lived in the country of reception for at least two years and meeting criteria of gender, skills and occupational sector.

The sampling of the core group of actual migrants was based on a quota design taking into consideration the home and host country of the migrants, gender and qualification level. The interviewed migrants were equally divided between men and women. One third were low-skilled and working in the sectors of construction, domestic care and transport; two thirds were highly-skilled in the sectors of finance, ICT and health. We aimed at maximum diversity for the rest of the individual
characteristics of the interviewees such as age, family status, housing situation and years of migration experience. Equal gender distribution and two to one ratio of high to low skills among potential migrants was also sought for without fixing other quota criteria. The experts had to be working either in state or private employment agencies at different positions in the organizational hierarchy. By country of origin the interviewees included 65 Bulgarians, 47 Romanians, 46 Spaniards, 46 Italians and 16 non-EU migrants (Chinese and Americans).
## Researchers involved

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* WP4 Leader
1. What motivates different groups of migrants for mobility and what factors explain their choice of the destination country?

The analysis of the 236 qualitative interviews of prospective and actual migrants and experts from recruiting agencies reveals a high diversity in the migration motivations in terms of ethnicity, accomplished education, skills level, economic sector, types of occupation, gender. Macro-level factors such as high unemployment rates in the countries of departure cannot sufficiently explain aspirations for mobility. The individual strategies and experiences of migration need to be analysed and understood in different types of context. In a similar way the approach to policy making needs a focus on the multiple layers of context when devising legislative changes or policy programs and schemes. Social inequalities stemming from ethnicity, accomplished education, skills level, economic sector, types of occupation as well as gender often have different impact depending on the context of the sending and receiving countries. Thus, migrants from Italy and Spain more often look for career opportunities in Germany and the UK while migrants from Bulgaria and Romania are motivated more often by income differences and tend to accept jobs below their educational level. The highly skilled health professionals such as doctors from all countries choose the destination when they find that it offers better career opportunities, while the nurses (medium skill level) from Bulgaria and Romania tend to accept starting in low skilled caring jobs. Better labour market opportunities are factors important for all types of migrants but often migrants choose the country of arrival based on very little knowledge about the norms regulating employment and social security. Our analysis also underlines the significance of the city as an attractive force for migrants. The image of London and Berlin as global cities offering high quality of work and life and a variety of multicultural experiences entice mainly young Europeans who are not only in search of better job opportunities, but also a better lifestyle and the possibility for autonomy and adventure.

2. What are the formal and informal channels for mobility and what groups of migrants predominantly choose which channel?

Public agencies regulate a tiny share of the mobility stream in the European labour market. Private agencies in some of the countries have a somewhat higher success in recruiting and serving prospective migrants but still most migrants prefer to use informal channels such as friends, relatives and neighbours. The highly skilled migrants in IT, finance and medicine tend to contact employers directly while also profiting from personal contacts with colleagues and friends. Women and older migrants tend to rely more on strong personal ties for organizing the mobility and job search while young migrants and highly skilled professionals use weak contacts of colleagues and acquaintances and online sources as occupationally specific websites and social networks. Debates on EU mobility
policies tend to be focused on regulations for labour migration in the receiving countries and how best to attract and retain highly skilled workers. However, more attention should be focused on the policies and practices of European labour mediation in the sending countries, for example, by organizing information campaigns on the added value of labour mobility for all sides involved. This could also take the form of increased training and networking among experts in the field, particularly for EURES councillors and managers of state employment agencies in the new member states such as Bulgaria and Romania as well as Italy and Spain (‘new’ countries of emigration). Improved cooperation between public and private agencies would foster more support for labour migrants, guarantee their rights and improve their work-family life balance in spite of some of the disruptive aspects of the migration experience.

3. Which factors facilitate and which hinder the successful adaptation of migrants in the new context?

The complexity if the link between migrants’ expectations, preparation steps, channels for the job search often results in various difficulties that migrants face in the first months of adjustment to the new economic, political, social and cultural conditions. The lack of language proficiency is a significant barrier to mobility in the European labour market which can be reduced with increased investment in foreign language teaching in public schools as well as in various forms of long-life learning outside the regular school curriculum. Another challenge for potential and actual migrants is the preparation of the required documents such as university diplomas, training and skill certificates. European policies should take into consideration that the homogenization of professional training and its accreditation across European countries could further facilitate mobility. This is more valid in sectors such as health care and construction, which need a mobile workforce the most. Notwithstanding similar needs in terms of bureaucratic documentation, migrants we interviewed told us very different experiences with public officers they addressed: in some cases they expressed satisfaction, in some others they pointed out the malfunctioning of public offices, which made the preparation for mobility a problematic and time-consuming effort. Moreover, migrants often depart with insufficient knowledge of sectoral specific regulations. Beyond processes of red tape reduction that are still needed, it could be important to put more attention on the role and the working practices of front-line officers who work in various public offices both in sending and receiving countries, strengthening their training and competences. Again, non-formal sources of support in the new context have a most significant impact, as well as the individual readiness to acquire new social capital in the host country. Religious, charity and other non-profit organisations have accumulated a wide expertise in assisting newcomers but occupational and community associations can increase the inter-ethnic contacts and reduce ethnic discrimination in access to housing and financial services.

4. What are the integration pathways followed by different groups of migrants and what accounts for achieving career growth, quality of work and quality of life?

The successful integration of migrants in the host society is highly dependent on their satisfactory access to the local labour market. Our data found a variety of upward, downward and horizontal work trajectories among migrants from South and East Europe. However, there is a clear of migrants from Italy and Spain in the medical professions, finance and ICT in the UK and Germany and the overrepresentation of Romanians and Bulgarians in construction and cleaning. A significant different
between the two groups in their integration strategies is that migrants from Spain and Italy have had more prior experiences of mobility and some knowledge of foreign cultures, often from short-term educational exchanges. Being in possession of a job-offer prior to departure, opportunities for additional education and training, access to local language courses, stable integration into professional and social networks, in short, high levels of human and social capital are undoubtedly beneficial to migrants in the context of the countries of reception. Underlining the role of education, we should particularly stress the significance of EU educational initiatives such as the Lifelong Learning Programme and Erasmus Plus for the adaptation and career growth of migrants. Finally, the role of trade unions in educating and integrating migrants’ in the local work cultures and defending their rights seems underdeveloped and should be encouraged. The analysis shows that discrimination at work operates at several dimensions: gender-based, practiced by employers and employees alike, between different nationality and ethnic groups in the same workplace. The occurrence of such cases in the working lives of migrants requires stricter measures for guaranteeing equality, especially in multi-cultural labour environments. Experiences of integration are highly influenced by migrants’ perceptions of the relative importance of their social ties ‘before’ (prior to departure) and ‘after’ (when already in the destination country). Maintaining active relationships with family members and friends remaining in the host country is not always easily achievable and sometimes not desired by migrants. Creating new families, friendship, neighbourhood and collegial ties is often more demanding than anticipated by migrants. In the new social context, keeping ‘open doors’ to the communities of co-nationals generates a different model of integration compared to the ‘open doors’ approach to the communities of locals and migrants from other nationalities.

5. **How and in what ways do migrants experience changes in their values and identities?**

Perceiving the migration process as a learning experience allows for a deeper look into the complex renegotiation of cultural and political boundaries that migrants experience in their destination countries. What emerges here is the importance of negative images and stereotypes of certain migrant groups as well as, in some cases, of the migrant status as such, which may trigger a gradual ‘disidentification’ with the society of origin. At the same time, notions of one’s country of origin identity can be strengthened when challenged by the different and at times adverse social and cultural environment in the destination country. The development of multiple spaces and communities of belonging is often reflected upon as a positive outcome of the migratory process. Personal experiences of education abroad have an enriching impact on migrants’ sense of European identity. Thus, ensuring access to educational mobility for those less privileged in terms of less developed regions, lower social class and lower skills-levels is highly recommended. In the legal and political terrain, the identity-nationality link deserves special attention since it sometimes determines migrants’ decisions to apply or not for the citizenship of the host country. Measures to encourage civic and political participation of migrants in public life in both the receiving and the sending countries will also foster migrants’ feelings of belonging to the democratic European polity. In the context of the Brexit referendum in the UK, our study shows that concerns about mobility rights are weaker than expected, in part because of the persisting confidence in EU citizenship. Perceptions of European citizenship, instrumental and based in pragmatic logic as it may be, nonetheless provides reassurance in situations of political turmoil and insecurity. Accordingly, measures aimed at strengthening EU citizenship and expanding access to permanent residency and dual citizenship rights may exercise soothing effects on the EU labour markets and the overall mobility situation in Europe.
The fieldwork of the six country teams in GEMM WP4 is over! We have 236 qualitative interviews of prospective and actual migrants (those already living in the four EU countries UK, Germany, Spain and Italy) and experts from recruiting agencies that have been audio recorded and fully transcribed. The overview of the sample provides insights into interesting trends in EU mobility.

The sampling of the core group of actual migrants was based on a quota design taking into consideration the home and host country of the migrants, gender and qualification level. As planned, the interviewed migrants were equally divided between men and women. One third were low-skilled working in the sectors of construction, domestic care and transport; two thirds were highly-skilled in the sectors of finance, ICT and health. We aimed at maximum diversity for the rest of the individual characteristics of the interviewees such as age, family status, housing situation and years of migration experience. As a result, the interviewed migrants were in the following age groups: 30% - up to 29, 40% - between 30 and 39, and 30% - 40 and over. Living as single were 39% and married or in partnership were 61% and 38% had children. The actual migrants were equally divided between those living alone in the host country and those living with their families. All migrants had at least two years of migration experience in the host country and were divided into 43% having less than 5 years and 57% having 6 or more years.

There was a high variation of the educational level of migrants from the four countries. Those from Italy and Bulgaria most often had done post-graduate studies and were holding MA or PhD while a third of Romanian migrants had low education (ISCED3 or Figure 2).
Figures 3 and 4 provide initial insights into the variety of the career paths of the interviewed migrants. Figure 3 shows that the migrants in our sample with high education from Spain and Italy most often continued working in jobs that were at the same qualification level that they had before migrating while those from Bulgaria and particularly from Romania less often managed to keep their high level. Significant shares of migrants from all countries experienced a downward career path – from 8% of Spanish to 19% of Bulgarian migrants.

The last figure draws a picture of migrants’ careers in the receiving countries. They were very similar in the UK and Germany with 70% of highly skilled migrants working in highly skilled jobs, while in Italy and Spain this was valid only for less than a third of the highly educated. In Spain there was the highest share (a quarter) of highly educated migrants who had made a fall toward low qualified jobs.

SUMMARY

These results do not claim representativeness for the situation of the migrants’ labor market integration in the countries of reception. They demonstrate the great diversity of individual situations and transition paths which are currently analyzed in-depth and will be presented in the upcoming analytical reports.

Now, the teams are working on the country reports which will be followed by comparative analysis of the individual and institutional factors of mobility.
This briefing presents initial results from the analysis of the qualitative data gathered in Bulgaria during the fieldwork in the first half of 2017. It focuses on the recruiting practices of public and private agencies dealing with international labour mediation. We use 12 expert interviews conducted in Bulgaria as a country traditionally sending workers abroad but having less than 10 years of institutional participation in EU mobility networks. We interviewed experts on different levels of the organizational hierarchy, as well as owners of private agencies. Most were women in mid and late career stages.

INTRODUCTION

Formal recruiters manage a very limited sector of labour mobility out of the country - about 2%. They function in competition with other mobility channels such as informal contacts with relatives and friends, unregistered recruiters using unofficial Internet sites, tourist companies or direct contacts with employers used by those mastering foreign languages and having the right skills. The interviewed experts overwhelmingly considered that they protect migrants’ rights much better than the informal channels.

‘At least we guarantee that this employer exists, that we have been in contact with him and that he will not deceive them and will provide a legal employment contract. While we all know that there are many advertisements on the Internet that are require advance payment from job seekers without then providing a real contract...’

(manager in a public agency)

The state and private agencies have different practices of labour mediation. The official discourse of those working as EURES advisors and other mediators in the public agencies was dominated by ‘professionalism’. The interviewees explained in length that they offered sound advice by well trained professionals and relied on the wide professional network of EURES offices in other European countries and a wider pool of vacancies. The experts from the private agencies underlined their efforts to better match the demands of potential employers with the skills of potential candidates and that they have a more ‘understanding’ attitude offering more human and individualized help to people about to make the ‘frightening’ step.

‘We have EURES advisors, EURES assistants, psychologists, lawyers... We provide real professional help before people leave... And then if anything goes wrong, we can always get in contact with the EURES office in the other country’

(expert in a public agency)

‘We have a direct relationship with the particular employer and the particular worker. In the Labour Offices there is no individual approach to each candidate, like a conveyor belt. People are not given detailed explanations... and they leave with quite different expectations and then come back dissatisfied... We know how stressful a trip abroad can be... We not only are giving information and advising them about the work, we are also kind of helping them psychologically too’

(expert in a private agency)
The interviewed experts saw both positive and negative consequences of emigration and had an ambiguous attitude towards the policy of encouraging labour mobility in Europe. The representatives of both public and private agencies shared the opinion that it had a positive impact for migrants personally and employers abroad, but negative for migrant families and the home labour market.

'I think it’s good and useful for everybody to at least try out what it is working abroad even for a shorter period of time because they can learn a lot about it ... in the sense, work abroad is based on completely different principles, and as I said, the pay is better in times... Most people are affected positively and come back with a good impression.'

(manager of a private agency)

'Nobody leaves if happy at home... I can understand them but still the social relations suffer, children suffer ... Generations of children who grow up in grandparents’ care... the effect is very large, very deep and very unpleasant.'

(mediator in a private agency)

'...The policy should create conditions here so that young people in particular stay here and give their knowledge here, not to work abroad... I do not want much ... to make it even easier to go out because [our country] will be left without specialists'

(expert in a public agency)

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

Debates on EU mobility policies are focused on regulations for labor migration in the receiving countries and how best to attract and retain highly skilled workers in the context of global competition for skills and population ageing. More attention should be focused on the policies and practices of European labor mediation in the sending countries. The analysis of the qualitative interviews of mediators in public and private agencies in the four countries sending migrants suggests the following steps:

- Information campaigns about the added value of labor mobility for all countries involved, both sending and receiving mobile workers
- Training and networking among experts in the field, particularly for the EURES councilors and managers of state employment agencies in the new member states such as Bulgaria and Romania but also in the countries such as Italy and Spain who are ‘new’ countries of departure
- Improved cooperation between public and private agencies in supporting labor migrants, protecting their rights and helping them reconcile their family responsibilities.
INTRODUCTION

This briefing presents the main results from the analysis of the qualitative data gathered by the Romanian country team under the WP 4 – Lived experiences of migration - of the GEMM project at the end of the year 2016 and the first half of 2017. It focuses on the individual and contextual factors that shape the motivations of Romanian migrants. The Romanian team conducted 48 interviews, of which: 10 with prospective migrants, 28 with actual migrants from Germany, Italy, UK, and Spain, and 10 with managers and staff from recruitment agencies. The sampling plan for migrants aimed at maximum diversity in terms of age, gender, education, and length of migration experience. The recruitment of interviewees was based on the snow-ball method in the case of prospective and actual migrants and on direct approach from a list in the case of recruitment agencies; public agencies were selected as to cover both national and county levels; and at county level, regions at different levels of socio-economic development. Private agencies were selected based on Internet information to ensure different areas of coverage (local, regional, national, and international). The interviews were mostly conducted face-to-face but in a few cases via Skype.

FINDINGS

1. The economic restructuring occurred after the change of political regime in Romania has led inter alia to a lack of jobs for people qualified in industrial trades previously required by the Romanian economy, while the education system was unable to adapt to the new requirements of the labour market. The transportation facilities that used to enable domestic mobility of the labour force have been discontinued, so that the employment opportunities have further decreased. The restitution of rural properties to the former owners did not help very much since most rural households lacked the technical means for working the land in a profitable manner. Hence, large categories of workers have become redundant and many of them opted for working abroad as a means of ensuring a decent living for themselves and for their families.

“Because in our country we haven’t had the possibility to work, neither I nor my husband, and we could not achieve anything.”
(Actual migrant, female, 47 y/o)

“The answer is one fold: for a better living, because in our country we had nothing to do. We were working in our kitchen garden, money was scarce, there were no available jobs.”
(Actual migrant, male, 40 y/o)

“First of all I wished to provide my child with better living; to build a future for him; although I haven’t has, at least to offer him everything he needs.”
(Prospective migrant, female, 28 y/o)
2. The socio-economic development in the Western countries had led inter alia to the occurrence of a lack of labour force in several sectors, requiring mainly unqualified and low qualified labour force, but not only. On the other hand, the political evolution aiming at European integration has brought along large opportunities for mobility of people, including for education and work purposes. New and more permissive regulations have been adopted at the EU level to encourage mobility in education and on the labour market.

“We (his wife and he), in principle, had been pretty well established in Bucharest; we had our apartment there, everything was very well, we had been travelling through Europe, we had already big salaries ..., we started thinking to move for a certain period but not too long and live somewhere in Europe. And thus - this is my impression - after Germany announced that Romanians may work in German without work permit, I was recruited by a company from German...”
(Actual migrant, male, 33 y/o)

“We are going to have a baby ... and we would prefer him to live in a much more open environment, more democratic and more civilised as compared to what it is foreseen to exist in Romania in the next 5-10 years.”
(Prospective migrant, male, 35 y/o)

“... After the Christmas Holidays (she had spent holidays in Italy at her sister) ... I went with my sister to her workplace (in a restaurant); the owner saw me and said come to work with us in the kitchen. My sister had been cleaning there and I had come along to help her ... The next day I went to work and remained there eight years.”
(Actual migrant, female, 39 y/o)

3. While confirming the important role of economic factors in the migration phenomenon, our research findings have also revealed that other contextual factors play important roles in the decision to migrate. Thus, our research findings have revealed that almost half of our migrant interviewees were fairly satisfied with their living conditions in the home country, which does not mean that such migrants were not looking for better living conditions but that other factors have to be explored for accurate understanding of the migrants’ motivation. Our analysis revealed that 4 out of 10 prospective migrants and 16 out of 28 actual migrants evoked also factors relating to the social climate and/or to the political climate.

„... It depends on what kind of persons we are speaking of; there are persons with university degrees and high qualifications and these people look for a safer social and political environment and a society, so to say, developed, where social services have reached an acceptable level, while persons with lower qualifications or unqualified look for incomes that they may bring back home and turn themselves round”
(Expert public recruitment agency, male, 40 y/o)

„Yes, we have come to a period at the limit, a saturation regarding the mentality and the way in which things were going on in our country”
(Prospective migrant, male, 35 y/o)

“... in Romania the hospital was paying me somehow but was putting me in a position of dependence upon a relationship in which, so to say, the patient had to sponsor the medical services. ... This is actually prostitution; one has to prostitute him/herself in order to obtain the money that in normal conditions s/he would be entitled to receive from the hospital in its capacity of employer.”
(AM, M, 44)
4. In terms of life goals relating to migration, we have identified several categories of migrants: from migrants without any life goals, or with goals that seem only incidentally linked to their motivation to migrate, through to migrants with life goals relating to a higher social status based on professional development or career advancement, living in different social contexts and reaching higher income and better standards of living.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>„In principle, professional fulfilment; when learning six years and achieving a profession one wants to practice it in the best conditions...”</th>
<th>„... I’ve always been curious to see other places as well and to study in other places as well, to keep studying and improve my professional qualification...”</th>
<th>„... I’ve chosen to come here because at that moment I thought that going to the best university in the world means better education”</th>
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<td>(Actual migrant, male, 31 y/o)</td>
<td>(Actual migrant, female, 31 y/o)</td>
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**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

With a view to increase effectiveness and efficiency, the policies aiming at minimising the loss of human capital should pay special attention to migrants’ motivations and include measures tailored to their needs and aspirations while also considering the general interest of the society. Such policies should aim at:

- Better and larger cooperation between public and private recruitment agencies in the sending countries, especially in the area of information and advice for prospective migrants.
- Improved regulations regarding the responsibilities of migrant parents towards their children left behind along with improved cooperation between child protection services from the sending and receiving countries in a view to minimise the negative impact of parents’ migration on the development of the children left behind.
- Setting up welcome structures in the countries receiving important numbers of immigrants with a view to facilitate their social adaptation; such structures should provide at least language courses, information on the local labour market and labour legislation as well as on institutions related to the labour market, information and advice regarding social norms in the host communities, information and advice regarding social protection and the health system.
- Promotion and support for projects aiming at facilitating social adaptation of migrants to host communities and improvement of their social life.
- Enhanced efforts in both sending and receiving countries to minimise the access to the illegal labour market as a means to avoid underemployment and improve the use of human capital.

Many such policies or policy measures may be also developed as projects financed from EU funds.
INTRODUCTION

This briefing presents selected relevant findings from the qualitative research of the WP4 of the Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets (GEMM) Project. It analyses Italian and Spanish migrants’ experiences and imaginaries of home country labour markets as part of their motivations to migrate to UK and Germany during the economic crisis.

FINDINGS

Experiences of precarious employment and negative images of the Italian and Spanish labour markets as reasons for migration

During recent years, a barrage of news reports on youth emigration from Italy and Spain has tended to present young Italians and Spaniards as “fleeing” their countries as a reaction to record high unemployment rates in the context of the economic recession. However, more than the lack of jobs, what especially seemed to fuel the desire to emigrate from both countries were experiences or perceptions of job instability and exploitation in home country labour markets.

Differences across sectors and skills level were found.

Professionals in architecture and civil engineering focused more on experiences of poor working conditions and precarious contracts as reasons for leaving Italy and Spain.

Architects and civil engineers often depicted their jobs as poorly paid and at times exploitative in terms of working hours.

Informants who were employed in lower-skilled sectors explained the decision to migrate as a result of job dissatisfaction or precarity, more than an absolute lack of work. Specifically, construction and hospitality services workers frequently emphasised irregular employment arrangements and delayed payment and/or cuts in wages as a reason to look for work abroad.

Images of dysfunctional labour markets in which young people are penalized

In addition to precariousness, poor working conditions, irregular employment, salary reductions and irregular payment of wages, another frequently cited reason for emigration has to do with representations of Spanish and Italian labour markets as inherently dysfunctional.

ITALY

«[In Italy] effort or talent are not recognized. I do not know why. In the end, those who make progress are the friends, the brothers of that guy, the friend of the other, the cousin of the other [...] It is a pity, because in Italy there are intelligent people, people of great value who no longer want to live there, and this is very sad». (Italian Architect, Germany, F, 28)

SPAIN

«There were positions [vacancies] at the municipality level, but [it was clear that] they were already given to someone else. […] These public offers would be published every now and then but there is always “a name” attached to them. So, they make the offers public because that’s the law, but they already know who they are going to hire». (Spanish technical architect, UK, F, 33)
Social environments and public discourse as catalysts for emigration decisions

Emigrants’ exposure to specific social environments and networks in which “other people” opted for migration and in which television, press and social media discourse may have influenced the migration decision. Indeed, social environments and public discourse undoubtedly shape social imaginaries and perceptions of national labour markets as well as the emigration phenomenon in itself in the context of the Great Recession.

ITALY

«Basically, I was curious, because everyone speaks of the English model and everyone tries to take it as an example, because it seems to work, because it is efficient. [...] Everyone went to London and so I did too» (Italian Cook, UK, M, 42).

SPAIN

«...I think that all of that was “in the air”. My sister had also left [Spain] a year and a half before me…for London…So, obviously, I was thinking [in terms of] ‘my sister has left and she is doing well’. That was also an incentive to...[leave]» (Spanish home cleaner, Germany, M, 28).

Media coverage of rising unemployment and outflows from Southern Europe in the context of the recession may have acted as a catalyst in individual migration decisions. Reports on emigration trends have been highly sensationalised in both Italy and Spain and have sparked disproportionately high levels of press, television and social media coverage.

Without underestimating the effects of the recent economic crisis on youth employment, we suggest that, in addition to actual lived experiences of searching for jobs and/or working, more abstract expectations and representations of labour market opportunities (in home and destination countries) play an important role in migration decision-making.

Disillusionment about the future of the country of origin and positive expectation in the destination countries.

Another factor that seems to shape evaluations and representations of work experiences in the country of destination has to do with the disillusionment that many respondents express about the future of their countries of origin.

On the other hand, regardless of the sector in which our informants are employed, they usually describe the labour markets of London and Berlin as dynamic labour markets with plenty of job opportunities.

Pessimism with respect to the long-term economic and social prospects of home countries may not only play a role in the decision to migrate, but also in prolonging the migratory experience or rejecting the possibility of return altogether. In addition, perceptions about the lack of prospects in the country of origin may cultivate resilience in the face of negative work and life experiences in the society of destination.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop more effective policies against nepotism and discrimination in the workplaces
- Reduce labour market segmentation in South European countries, where young people are likely to be trapped in precarious, low paid and/or irregular jobs.
INTRODUCTION

This briefing presents selected relevant findings from the qualitative research carried out by the Italian team under the WP4 of the Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets (GEMM) Project. One should bear in mind that our sample targeted only migrants active in the labour market and in specific activity domains (architecture, financial services, healthcare and ICT, for the highly skilled; construction, care-work and hospitality services for the low skilled). We interviewed Bulgarian, Romanian, Italian and Spanish migrants who live and work in London or in Berlin.

FINDINGS

IDENTITY RE-POSITIONING: A TYPOLOGY

The migration process can provoke considerable changes in a person’s self-understanding, cultural identification and orientation to national and supranational political communities. Exposure to and interaction with individuals from different national and cultural groups can have a destabilizing effect on migrants’ identities, either strengthening the previously held sense of belonging to the home country or challenging the ‘pre-existing’ national and/or supranational identification. Migrants define their identity and express feelings of attachment to different territorial and cultural entities. The focus is on the country of origin, the receiving society (at the locality and/or national-country level), as well as at the supranational EU level. Changes of both self-images and cultural/identity patterns are a pretty complex issue. In introductory - and somewhat schematic – terms, it is possible to highlight four types.

Re/Identification with Country of Origin

A common subjective self-identification of our respondents is the cultural attachment with the country of origin. In all four case studies, first and foremost, the majority of the respondents expressed their sense of rootedness to the cultural tradition of the home country. Strong identification with the home country culture does not seem to correlate with migrants’ socio-demographic characteristics, that is their age, level of education, profession, length of stay, citizenship status and gender. However, the analysis of the interviews suggests the importance of historical, political and socio-economic contexts in shaping identities. For instance, Bulgarians’ and Romanians’ attachment to their home country may be shaped by problematic reception in the receiving society whereas Italians and Spaniards seem to ‘rediscover’ certain traits of their home society they were less aware of previous to migration, encouraging them to reaffirm their attachment to lifestyles and values in the country of origin they perceive as absent from the country of residence. Strong identification with Italian and Spanish culture is often framed in opposition to the local cultural model of the host society.
**Acculturation or “disidentification”**

A second identity pattern concerns the internalization of the national culture of the host society while developing a more critical vision of their society of origin than they had in the past (detachment from the predominating mentalities in the ‘home culture’). East European informants are more inclined to differentiate themselves from their fellow nationals who are also emigrants; while West European ones most commonly create distinctions with those ‘left behind’ or with the prevailing ‘Mediterranean mentality’ in their home societies. All these subjects perceive and describe themselves in positive and idealized terms as resilient people able to overcome deeply internalized cultural habits. Those who ‘stayed behind’, are described in essentialised and reified terms as ‘cultural-dopes’, unable to free themselves from the bonds of the culture of origin. Hence, the subjects of reference for Italians and Spaniards tend to be those who remain behind, rather than migrant co-nationals as is more the case for Romanians and Bulgarians.

Sincerely I feel less Romanian [...] There are people and there are people. Being Romanian is not always a proud thing in Spain because due to the wrong doings of many here. [RO.ES.AC.3.M.31]

I cannot stand certain things about it [Italy] anymore. [...] The myopia of the typical Italian, in the sense of this parochialism, these “factions” (dissenting groups). Italy is going nowhere; our mentality is overly defensive. [...] I have known different people, I have seen different things - for better or for worse - I have had many more experiences. The first year, I spent was could be comparable to having spent ten years in Italy, in the sense that I have seen so many more things, many more contexts [...] We are far behind, far less civilized, far less respectful of the rules. (IT.UK.AC.8.M.40)

Here, I feel changed. How can I explain this...Here, I really realized just how raucous I was. ... Rauous in the sense that we [Spaniards] yell a lot, you know? My character has changed, my way of behaving ... I can’t stand when people yell now, it bothers me. [...] You end up acting [differently] because it’s what you see around you. It’s the right way [to act]. I’ve realized that the right way is this, not what I was doing before. Throwing trash on the ground, crossing at a red light, this isn’t good behaviour. The thing is, in Spain, you do it and no one will say anything, it’s normalized. (SP.DE.AC.21.M.36)

**Cosmopolitanism / European identity**

The third type of identity pattern is related to cosmopolitan and European identifications. These attitudes concern those individuals who may simultaneously value national cultural references of the country of origin while also adapting easily to new lifestyles. Not only do these individuals embrace new cultural environments, but they also tend to define their new identities as being in-between two or three ‘worlds’: the country of origin, the country of destination and a supranational European and/or cosmopolitan identity. In this respect, prior mobility experiences (mainly through student exchange schemes) together with the duration of EU membership of the countries of origin under investigation make it more likely that individuals identify themselves in this category.
Cosmopolitanism / European identity

Many respondents confirmed the ease of inclusion in the urban contexts of Berlin and London, which were perceived as very international and open to integrating foreigners. Furthermore, some respondents specifically trace their cosmopolitan attitudes as being shaped or strengthened by the metropolitan/multicultural and globalized context in which they are living.

Living in London puts you in touch with the world. For example, I work in a team where there is an Italian, I, a Spaniard, a Frenchman, a girl from Hong Kong, my boss is an American, a Lebanese. There are 4 English and one German (IT.UK.AC.14.M.36)

I: Do you ever feel like someone from here, like a Berliner?
P: Yes. Not like a German, but I sometimes feel like a Berliner. [...] I feel very comfortable in Berlin. (SP.GE.AC.22.M.29)

Overall, identity show a fundamentally positional nature. Interviewees are aware that they have acquired a variety of cultural references together with a cross-cultural communicative competence that allow them to cope with many different situations of everyday life, deliberately and consciously staging a multiplicity of dramatis personae:

“When I go to a pub on Sunday to have lunch I feel like a foreigner, because here in the pubs on Sundays there are only the English. When I go to work I feel English, when I go to the bank I feel English. When I go to the airport I feel English. When I go for shopping I feel Italian. When I go to eat for dinner I feel Italian. When I come home I feel a bit ‘both’. When I know someone who comes from Europe, like France, Spain, I feel English. (IT.UK.AC.11.F.28 - Midwife).

BEYOND THE TIPOLOGY: TACTICAL IDENTIFICATION

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Create more opportunities for early mobility (during high-school and university), strengthening exchange programmes between E.U. countries.
- Develop the Erasmus Plus programme further to target students and workers in manual trade occupations/vocational training in order for them to acquire EU mobility experience and international labour market skills at an early stage.
- Focus on previous mobility experience that can both stimulate multicultural attitudes and facilitate cultural integration of intra-European migrants.
INTRODUCTION

This briefing presents selected relevant findings from the qualitative research carried out by the Romanian team under the WP4 of the Growth, Equal Opportunities, Migration and Markets (GEMM) Project. One should bear in mind that our sample targeted only migrants active on the labour market (mostly employed but also temporary unemployed) and only in some activity domains (ICT, medicine and finance for the highly skilled; construction, transport and care work for the low skilled), so the findings from our analysis may differ from official statistics and/or the findings of other researches.

FINDINGS

REASONS TO MIGRATE

Experts’ from recruitment agencies voice

4 out of 5 experts from public recruitment agencies and 2 out of 5 experts from private recruitment agencies indicated ‘money’ or incomes.

1 expert from a public agency and 3 experts from private agencies evoked professional development and/or career advancement opportunities, but only with reference to the highly qualified migrants.

Migrant’s voice

22 evoked income and/or standard of living as their reasons to migrate; most of these were low education (16), married (13) and over 35 years old (12); gender does not seem to play a role in this regard (11 men and 11 women).

10 referred to education, professional development and/or career advancement and they were mostly highly educated (9), males (9) and under 35 years old (8); 6 married and 4 singles.

MIGRATION CHANNELS

Most of the interviewed migrants have not contacted any recruitment agency or undertaken any administrative steps in order to get a job in the destination countries. Only 3 prospective migrants mentioned that they asked a “hunting” agency to help them in getting more information about the destination country and about jobs; other 3 actual migrants who worked in Germany were hired by a German employer, mediated by a recruitment agency and 1 actual migrant from UK used a recruitment agency from UK to find a hosting family.
Lived experiences of Romanian migrants in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK
Octav Marcovici, Marin Burcea & Ionela Sufaru

“... I went to job fairs, I visited the main recruitment websites but often the recruiters found me and weekly I participated at interviews. [...] I used a recruitment agency from Poland which told me about the company from Leipzig and finally I was invited and tested at the company where I work now.” (RO.GE.AC.1.M.33)

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“My brother in law was taking care of (finding jobs); being there since long time ago he had some connections and found jobs for us, sometimes on daily basis, sometimes in agriculture, as he could, until I found a stable job in the bakery.” (RO.DE.AC.3.F.27)

Adaptation to host societies was much more difficult for migrants who did not know the local language, which was the case of most participants in our research.

“... I stayed one month at home, at my sister, about one month, until I found a job; I went to interviews but since I didn’t know the (Spanish) language I didn’t understand; it was difficult but within one month I found, they accepted me as I could speak ... and in time I begun speaking and after that I found employment easier.” (RO.SP.AC.6.F.47)

“... even now we stay several people in the same room, in the same apartment, in a house, but at that time it was even more crowded ... there have been the four of us, the three of them, some other three and one more, hence ten ... some lived in the living room” (RO.SP.AC.1.M.36)

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ADAPTATION DIFFICULTIES

Major difficulty encountered by the Romanian immigrants, mainly at the beginning of their life abroad. Very few could afford to rent a dwelling there and very few had benefited from (initial) accommodation provided by the employers. In most cases they had to live with family members, relatives or friends already settled there, who at their turn had been forced by the high level of rents to live in small apartments, already crowded.

Of high concern for all migrants, except those who started with education or vocational training who were, in general, recruited since their practical stages associated with education or training. 16 out of 28 Romanian migrants have relied on social ties for finding their first job abroad; in some cases the use of social ties was complemented with direct job search and even with applying to recruitment agencies. 11 out of 14 of highly educated migrants have either received direct job offers from the employers (4) or have applied to the services of recruitment agencies (5), or undertaken direct job search on the spot (2).

WORK TRAJECTORIES

As of the time of our field research, circa one third of Romanian actual migrants (10) had achieved a higher professional status in the host countries as compared to their professional status as of the time of leaving their home country, while another third (9) had remained at the same level. Only a small number of actual migrants had moved to tower professional position (4) and almost the same number (5) had completed higher education in the destination countries and obtained highly qualified positions.
EXPERIENCES OF UNEMPLOYMENT

10 out of 28 Romanian migrants had experienced unemployment: benefitted from unemployment allowance, 5 have not registered as unemployed either because they were living and working illegally in the destination countries (3) or because meanwhile they were working on the black labour market (2); in 4 cases the jobless immigrants have had particular reasons to do not register as unemployed (returning to Romania for a while during the crisis, being actually housewife, failing to register in due time because misunderstanding with employer). 18 participants have not experienced unemployment, yet in the case of self-employed there have been periods not covered by contracts with beneficiaries.

“I have been (working) from 2007 through 2011 with legal forms at the same restaurant; after its closure I have been unemployed in 2011 but I worked without legal forms to another restaurant; after this, having resigned from the other restaurant, from 2014 through 2015 I was unemployed (again).” (RO.IT.AC.2.F.39)

“This is the third (job) … for a Romanian, where I worked 8 years and this one where I have 2 years. I was unemployed for 8 months, during the crisis, in 2012. ... Yes, (it was paid) 980 Euro per month unemployment benefit.” (RO.SP.AC.5.M.40)

IDENTITY

Romanian first

Those feeling themselves first and foremost Romanians, this is they are Romanians first. This category is dominant among Romanian actual migrants.

22 out of 28 actual migrants, regardless the receiving country, are proud that they are Romanians. They have the feeling of belonging to Romanian social and cultural space.

“I feel myself a Romanian...I still love my country, I was born there and if we could have found jobs, maybe we would have not migrated.” (RO.SP.AC.2.F.47)

European first

Migrants who feel themselves more Europeans include only few cases (we met two interviewees of this type as a Romanian migrant woman from Italy says:

“[…] I feel more European but I felt it before coming here.” (RO.IT.AC.5.F.36)

Confused identity

Those feeling confused about their identity. Some of Romanian migrants feel they should say that they are Europeans not Romanians when they are asked what country they are from due to the negative image of Romanians projected by local media.

“Sincerely I feel less Romanian [...] the links with home country has begun less strong even though I like Romanian food [...] there are people and people, being Romanian is not always a proud in Spain because there are many who made bad things here.” (RO.SP.AC.3.M.31)

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Encouraging and stimulating better and larger cooperation between public and private recruitment agencies, including within the EURES network, in a view to best use their potential of providing suitable information and advice for prospective and actual migrants.
- Developing improved regulations regarding the responsibilities of migrant parents towards their children left behind along with improving cooperation between child protection services from the sending and receiving countries in a view to minimise the negative impact of parents’ migration on the personal and professional development of their children.
- Promoting and supporting community projects aiming at facilitating social adaptation of migrants to host communities and improvement of their social life.
- Enhancing the efforts in both sending and receiving countries to minimise the access to the black labour market as a means to avoid underemployment and improve the use of human capital.
WP5

This WP provides a better understanding of the embeddedness of the migration process within a policy context.

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* WP5 Leader
The main objective of this briefing is to outline the policies and regulations in EU15 countries, Norway, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that regard the management of migration and the successful and integration of immigrants. Within the broader GEMM objective, our goal is a better understanding of the embeddedness of the migration process within a policy context. To this end, we first examine citizenship regimes across countries and time using the ICRI dataset (Koopmans & Michalowski, 2017). Access to citizenship is of particular importance because it provides access to full rights and security of residence. In a second step we look at cross-country variation in the restrictiveness of immigration policies using the IMPIC dataset (Helbling et al., 2017). We especially consider potential differences between patterns in overall and in labour immigration policies. Lastly, we combine both data sources to investigate whether and how migration and integration policies correlate.

Findings 1
Our first analysis examines the development of citizenship regimes from 1980 to 2008 by using the ICRI dataset. We assess the position of countries on the two main sub-dimensions – cultural rights (i.e. equality of immigrant cultures relative to the majority) and individual rights (i.e. individual equality relative to non-immigrants). A few results become apparent from the below figure: first, there is a clear positive relationship between cultural and individual rights. States that are inclusive on the cultural dimension tend to also have more inclusive individual rights. Second, countries tend to be more inclusive on the individual dimension than on the cultural. Third, there is a general movement over time toward more inclusive rights on both dimensions. Last, over time relative differences between countries decrease as some less inclusive states such as Germany, Belgium, or Austria "catch up".

\[ r = 0.74 \ (p < 0.000) \]
Findings 2
Next, we look at the association between overall immigration policy restrictiveness and the restrictiveness in one policy dimension, namely labor immigration, using the IMPIC data from 2010. We find that the two measures correlate ($r = 0.34$), as could be expected, but the association is far from perfect, indicating that cross-country variation in immigration policy restrictiveness follows different patterns in different policy dimensions. For example, the below figures (higher values indicate higher restrictiveness) show that Ireland has the most restrictive overall immigration policy, but a relatively permissive labour immigration regime. Austria, on the other hand, has liberal immigration policies in general but a stringent labour immigration regime.

Findings 3
In a last step we combine the ICRI and the IMPIC dataset to investigate whether there is a relationship between the restrictiveness of the immigration policies of a country and the inclusiveness of its citizenship policies. As the figure below demonstrates, countries with more restrictive immigration policies tend to have more inclusive citizenship regimes. This finding suggests that governments face a trade-off when designing policies for managing migration and the integration of immigrants: inclusive citizenship and integration regimes depend on stringent immigration policies because the latter are assumed to select migrants based on factors that facilitate integration (Cangiano, 2014). However, it is an open question whether restrictive immigration policies lead to better integration outcomes for immigrants.
A few conclusions follow from our analyses. First, citizenship regimes with more inclusive cultural rights also tend to have more inclusive individual rights. Second, over time citizenship regimes became more inclusive and relative differences between countries diminish. Third, variation in the restrictiveness of labour immigration regimes does not strictly follow the same pattern as in overall immigration policies, suggesting that within countries, levels of restrictiveness vary by policy dimension. Last, there appears to be a trade-off between the restrictiveness of immigration policies and the inclusiveness of citizenship and integration regimes.

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